

RAM

Unveil, O Thou who givest sustenance to the world, that face of the true Sun, which is now hidden by a vase of golden light ! so that we may see the truth and know our whole duty.

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THE MESSAGE OF ALL TIME

The scientist is more than any science, as the man of devotion is superior to any religion, and the philosopher more profound than any depths of thought. After the writer has uttered his appeal, after the reader has conned the printed folio, then each returns upon himself, like a spectator devoid of a spectacle, for the Soul of man is the end as it is the beginning of all effort and of all wisdom. The seed of spiritual awakening lies in the recognition that the least of men equally with the greatest holds in himself the mystery of all time ; that the Soul is the Perceiver, and never can he see but image or shadow of Self in any vision or in any field of perception.

But the Soul called man is creator as well as seer, and never shall he be other than housed or prisoned in his own creations. To

imagine otherwise is to deny one's own inherent divinity, to be ignorant of one's own creative power ; is to spin a cocoon of self-immurement whose only escape is death and rebirth, instead of the conscious weaving of the vesture of immortality.

From the plane of the self-illuminated Soul our science, our religion and our philosophy alike are but mirages, the phantasmagoria of human consciousness, whose only value is negative—to enforce the lesson that beyond all creation is the creator, beyond things seen and things done is the Seer. From any other perspective than that of the enduring Self man is engulfed in the blindness which does not see that neither in the unit nor in the assembly is any citadel of thought impregnable to assault from without, or permanently tenable to

the inhabiting Genius. For the seeing man in the dark is as blind as the sightless man in the light. At home within one's Self who can fail to glimpse, to grasp, to realize there is Something behind all science which must forever elude all analysis—the Indiscrete within and without all discrete objects? There is Something to which the prayer of the faithful does not reach; Something that our philosophy can neither explain nor adjust—something Infinite, to which our enclosures are non-existent. The sleeping Soul, the dreaming Soul, the waking Soul—one and the same Soul, but what a distinction of states, what a difference of realization.

It is this highway of Soul which is the Aryan Path, the *noble* path. It is travelled by all the Sages no less than by ourselves, but they travel it in full consciousness, albeit side by side with the dreamers and the sleepers. These latter the Sages no more disturb than the brooding mother the cradled babe, asleep, not in matter, but nestled within the two arms of love and knowledge. Who can doubt that love without knowledge is better than much learning without love? Mother-love has something of both. Without it, none of us had been born, none could survive. Even so, without the compassionate wisdom of the Sages none could be "born again," or survive in the world of Souls.

To the somnambulist Souls, called human beings, there come in their retired moments soundless

echoes which blend with the breath of their own inmost longings. This is the Voice of the Silence, of Self communing with self, which the books call meditation. That voice speaks without distinction of race, creed, sex, party, or condition, and so can be heard only when the tumult and the shouting die in head and heart alike. Not till then can the human eye see, can the human ear hear, can the human mind learn, can the human heart feel, the spiritual influx of the Divine life within the carapace of selfhood. That influx is the seminal principle in all that lives—in the shine of the sun, in the air we breathe, in all the motions and emotions of the three worlds. Incarnation and reincarnation are the descent and the redescend of Souls from the formless unity of the all-pervading Spirit to the plains of space and time and action. The Sages make the journey consciously for the sake of all Souls; man, alas, makes the same journey as a dreamer voyages, "as idle as a painted ship upon a painted ocean".

The Message is the same however the sails are set, and in whatsoever wind that blows across the seven seas or rests amidst our doldrums. It is the same whether voiced by a Krishna, a Buddha, a Shankara or a Christ. Its meaning is the same within the savage heart or on Apollo's lyre, to him who listens as to him who speaks. But by the dreaming Soul, even of the saintliest it is heard only as the sigh of

one's own longing, the pulse within the chamber of one's own heart. It is the message of unity in the midst of diversity, of brotherhood in the midst of separateness, of the eternal verity within the mortal comprehension.

The Sages can only deal with the dreaming Soul called man as they find him. Why is this? No more than the physical embryo can come through foetal stages to natural birth in mortal existence if interfered with, can the dreaming Soul come to natural birth into the spiritual life. No miracle of science, religion, or philosophy can turn the tender plant into the Tree of Life. One and all, our human helps are an interference with the own nature of the Soul, which is freedom, consciousness, and such knowledge as these induce. Self-knowledge is to be gained by preter-human means: "Self-knowledge is of loving deeds the child," and the highest human ideals are but dreams of brotherhood which, however they nourish the dreamer, come in fact from beyond the horizon of human self-interest.

To glimpse this is in fact to stir in one's sleep, is to see if but for an instant that Soul-knowledge is a transmission and not an acquisition—a transmission from the world divine to the human world. To see this is to assimilate something of the *being* of the Sages, as well as to realize the nature of the limitations necessarily imposed upon them when they descend from the sphere of their knowledge to our "sphere of expecta-

tions". If they would not violate the law of their own nature and of ours, the law of the Soul's *birth-right*, they must perforce "become in all things like one of us"—respect our dream properties and proprieties.

So never does the Sage seek to overwhelm our understanding however limited. He addresses us ever and always within the terms of our own devising; speaks to us of the dimensionless Soul within the formative limits of our senses, our sensations, our desires and aspirations. When he would have us kindle the sacred fire of the real Presence, he points out to us that no imaginable study of fuel will acquaint us with the nature of physical fire. His words are but a painted lamp to us until we catch the fire of his inspiration. So, when the Sages speak to us of the Real the dreamer of the noblest dreams sees at best but an image to be worshipped from afar off. So, we gauge the deathless, timeless, birthless Soul, by bodily wands and plummets. All the utterances of the *Achyuta*, the unfailing, are addressed to the *Chyuta*. We hear the words but, fallen Souls that we are, we think of our Estate and of theirs, and so do not hear the language of the Soul, but only that of the mind and emotions.

Yet here and there a dreamer rouses; quick or quickened by the divine impulsion to reach out for the union of all souls, he begins to question the reality of his own perceptions and conceptions, rather than those of other men.

These few are the "strivers for perfection" to whom the message of all time is in especial directed. They are the ones to be sought out, found, united in the bond of true fraternity, educated to the majesty of the eternal Wisdom-Religion, that they may be added to the chain of transmission called the Theosophical Movement. This chain stretches from the highest *Mahatma* to the humblest lover of his fellow-men. When this is seen, then the iron chain called Karma by the dreaming Souls turns to the pure gold of selfless action whose fruits feed all the creatures of the three worlds, but whose secret essence, the *prajna* of all experience, "makes of a man a God, creating him a Bodhisattwa, Son of the Dhyanis."

BUDDHAS OF CONFESSION

[H. P. Blavatsky writes in *The Secret Doctrine* (II. 423) as under. The extract should be read in conjunction with the article on p. 304.—EDS.]

"Thirty-five Buddhas of Confession," though called in the Northern Buddhist religion "Buddhas," may just as well be called Rishis, or Avatars, etc., as they are "Buddhas who have preceded Sakyamuni" only for the Northern followers of the ethics preached by Gautama. These great Mahatmas, or Buddhas, are a universal and common property: they are *historical* sages—at any rate, for all the Occultists who believe in such a hierarchy of Sages, the existence of which has been proved to them by the learned ones of the Fraternity. They are chosen from among some ninety-seven Buddhas in one group, and fifty-three in another,* mostly imaginary personages, who are really the personifications of the powers of first-named.† These "baskets" of the oldest writings on "palm leaves" are kept very secret. Each MS. has appended to it a short synopsis of the history of that sub-race to which the particular "Buddha-Lha" belonged. The one special MS. from which the fragments which follow are extracted, and then rendered into a more comprehensible language, is said to have been copied from stone tablets which belonged to a Buddha of the earliest day of the Fifth Race, who had witnessed the Deluge and the submersion of the chief continents of the Atlantean race. The day when much, if not all, or that which is given here from the archaic records, will be found correct, is not far distant. Then the modern symbologists will acquire the certitude that even Odin, or the god Woden, the highest god in the German and Scandinavian mythology, is one of these thirty-five Buddhas; one of the earliest, indeed, for the continent to which he and his race belonged, is also one of the earliest.

* Gautama Buddha, named Shakra Thub-pa, is the *twenty-seventh* of the last group, as most of these Buddhas belong to the *divine dynasties* which instructed mankind.

† Of these "Buddhas," or the "Enlightened," the far distant predecessors of Gautama the Buddha, and who represent, we are taught, once living men, great adepts and Saints, in whom the "Sons of Wisdom" had incarnated, and who were, therefore, so to speak, minor Avatars of the Celestial Beings—eleven only belong to the Atlantean race, and 24 to the Fifth race, from its beginnings. They are identical with the Tirtankaras of the Jinas.

THE PROBLEM OF THE 'MAN' AS BECOMING

[We welcome Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, M. A., D. Litt., the well-known Pali Scholar, the President of the Pali Text Society, and author of numerous volumes on Buddhism, among our contributors. It is an auspicious coincidence that her article reaches us just in time for this issue, for during the month of May the Buddhist world celebrates the Vaishakha festival which this year falls on the 20th.

In sending the article Mrs. Davids informs us that so far as she knows "the subject is new". She has presented an interesting thesis in so thorough a manner that not only the academician but also the ordinary educated reader will be able to enjoy it.

The object of the article?—"To show that the New Word, brought to his country by Gotama Sakyamuni, was not a reversal of that country's best religious teaching, but the effort to make it a living religion for every man and woman His main work was in training a tender shoot of a wonderful plant so that following on the work of preparation done just before his time in India, it might 'become' what there was in it to become."—EDS.]

I

Yo Brahma veda, Brahma-iva bhavati

Who knows Brahma, becomes as Brahma.

—Mund. Up. III, ii, 9.

We shall never rightly understand what it was that Gotama Sakyamuni as founder of 'Buddhism' taught, unless we place him in his true framework: the religious teaching of the India of his day. We might as well try to understand Jesus' teaching aloof from all reference to the religious teaching in Palestine at the beginning of our era, or John Wesley's teaching apart from the Christianity of England in the eighteenth century. Great teachers have their setting in the historical tradition of their own countries; if they are founders of world-religions, they have a further setting, namely, in the history of the world as in process of religious 'becoming'. Our business is here and now with the former setting. And

in a much overlooked episode in those priceless fragments of the Buddhist *Vinaya-Pitaka* of the Pali Canon, we come up against it.

We read that, in the second week after Gotama is said to have been 'enlightened' (lit. thoroughly awakened), and was at the 'Goat-herd's Banyan,' he was accosted by a brahman, belonging to a school or clan, of which the name has been oddly corrupted: the Huhunka-jāti. (Readings of the name vary, betraying half-forgotten records. It may have been Susukka-jāti—a change of s to h we often see. This would give us Very-Bright-clan, a term we can parallel in Teutonic names).* After courteous greetings on both sides, the brahman asked these questions: "To what extent, master

* *Huhum* is in the Pali text assumed to be a snorting, disdainful habit!

Gotama, is one genuinely brahman, and what are the things that make a brahman?" The reply is much to the point, but it has been edited in verse (for memorizing) in terms that bear the mark of a stock scriptural saying, used elsewhere in the *Suttas*. It has ceased to be the reply we can hear one earnest inquirer stopping in his walk to make to another earnest inquirer.

A brahman—
He who has barred out* evil things, is not
A man of humph-and-pshaw, whose is no stain,
Who has the self controlled, in Vedas versed,
Who lives the Brahma-life, 'tis he may say
His is the Brahma-faith, for whom there are
No false excrescences in all the world.

Each speaker apparently goes his own way. The little fragment alone remains. For us it is of value. We can hear the corresponding modern question: "What man do you, Mr. So and so, judge to be a Christian indeed? Not just one who has been baptized, or who is an ordained priest."—or the exclamation: "Behold an Israelite indeed in whom is no guile!" The brahman as such was much like the Levite to other Israelites to this extent, that in virtue of his birth, religious duties were vested in him alone. His was it alone to learn and recite the Veda hymns; his alone to celebrate the ritual; his it was chiefly to be teacher of the sons of those who could afford to pay him, giving them many years of what we should now call a University education. He was honoured for this and he honoured himself. He was in that day the churchman in a very full sense.

As teacher he had no full monopoly, for kshatriyas (nobles, rajas) could be teachers, as we read. In these and in the brahmans we see the world of culture of that day. It is not the world of the Many, but it was certainly a world of attention to the things most worth while. And we see Gotama, by this time well known (the Commentary reminds us of this) as a persistent earnest student, with brahmans and other nobles, of such worth-while things, consulted as one in sympathy with their inquiries.

The question indicates too, that within as well as without this church-cultured world, among brahmans, as well as among the new Jaina body for instance, there was going on an active religious interest, a quest for the real, the sincere, as more worth while than a world of codes and rites and habits of a formalized religion, a feeling after the better as something New, as a something More than established religion was giving them.

As these inquiries gained force, shortcomings in the established church, especially, it is said, in the North East rather than in the North West of India, would tend to be shown up. In the later Pitaka books we find strictures on brahman morals emerging. And this tendency has found its way into the episode with which I began, the work probably of later editors. It is in fact, in the telling, made so absurd, so unlikely in its absurdity, that it is easy to

read between the lines and see beneath the serious lofty inquiry which is met by a serious lofty, and also courteous response. It gives us a fleeting glimpse of what was afoot at the time and is akin to much else that emerges in Upanishad and Pitaka: a new interest both in practical religion and in things of the unseen, both during and after earth-life, an interest in "dhyana," or study in psychic access to the unseen, a new interest in causation as a mental procedure, a new interest in mind as distinguishable from the man.

I do not think we may look to find any world-religion launched without a preparatory responsiveness of this kind being astir among men just then and there, shortly before the birth of it takes place. Its world is getting ready for it. It is not easy for us, to whose world no recent gospel-mandate of any proven power to grow, to sway men, to persist, has come and who have very fragmentary records of the days when such a mandate was come, to put ourselves in such a world as that. Even were there no such fragments, some explanation of the little episode would be needed. As it is we seem to see this:—the message that was just coming made a singular appeal, the appeal of a supply to a demand, the response to something waited for.

It will not be in one way only in which the New Word will be felt as wanted. There is for instance this way—one that we have read of in this and that re-

ligious reform *within* a faith, and not as belonging to the birth of a mainly new gospel alone:—this is the felt need of a more vital and sincere life-expression of the faith professed. It is the appeal for 'works' to make real the faith, since a man only believes what he will live for, and if need be, die for. This is what we saw in the brahman's question. And this is what we seem to find is *not stressed in the Upanishads*.

Another way will be the need of a something *more* in the faith itself, around which questions are arising. This may prove to have been something which has already pre-occupied the cultured serious few, but to be only just emerging as a felt want among the Many. We have only to look into the fine ethical teaching of the Stoics before Jesus began his mission. And it may be that, while it is emerging for the Many through some Helpers of Men, it may have meanwhile been falling away among the Few. This may be, because the right, or 'die-hard' wing of the established religion has suppressed the more progressive movement in its fold. Or it may be, owing to a faltering in that movement itself: some ardent teacher has aged, or has died; some ardent but perverse junior has diverted the movement, brought in a way of the worse. But that progressive movement will have been taught to many young men, and so have been filtering out to find Everyman to some extent more or less ready for it. Now Everyman is a

* There is here a usual (and bad) pun:—*brāhma*—*bāh*.

practical fellow and will need something he can grip. The movement may need expanding, clarifying for him. But above all it may need to be made practical, part of his life.

This is how I see the progressive movement among the brahmins just preceding the birth of 'Buddhism,' as followed up by that which I see as its expansion, its stressing in the first 'Sakyan' mandate. It is shown, for me, in the increasing way in which the 'man' was being regarded less as a static being, more as a being in process of becoming other, different, *more*. I could easily show what I mean, if translators of the Upanishads had not so often, with one mainly consistent exception, slurred over this striking feature. Much depends on your considering this carefully, if you would find anything of weight in what is here set down.

Translators and readers, whether of text or translation, have overlooked this new feature about man's nature, mainly on one of three grounds. Firstly, they, we all, are the children of the Darwinian epoch. Consciously or unconsciously, we look at things from the standpoint of evolution to a degree unknown before. Not because we see men as changing only; there was nothing new in that. But the way in which we envisage change in man has become less of a mechanical, arithmetical change, more of a biological, more of a psychological change. We are more con-

cerned with change as a matter, not of quantities, but of values, of quality. Again, there is nothing new about this standpoint in the scope of our religions. Its newness lies in its present all-inclusiveness in our culture. Hence that an old-world literature is to be found putting this standpoint to the front may escape the notice of the modern translator, just because he sees nothing strange in it.

But here that alone would not suffice. It may be that grammatically the translator does not see, in the way of expressing this "process of becoming other," as much as I see in it. And here, as unversed in Vedic (old Sanskrit) literature, I am at a disadvantage. For him this verbal root *bhū*, 'become,' with its derivatives, may be merely a help to the other verbal root *ās*, 'to be,' the future form *bhavishyati*, being the same for both. We see this in German also, with its *sein* to be, *werden*, to become, where *wird* can mean "becomes," or just "will be". Hence one may, especially if he be German, find it equally right to translate, say, *bhavati* by "is," or by "becomes".

Thirdly, the translator may not be disinterested about the matter. He may see unwisdom in rendering the *bhū*-forms by "become"-forms, because he both knows that the progressive movement, in brahman teaching, to see the very man (not body or mind) as in process of change was eventually quashed, and holds it was well it was quashed. Hence he will

tend to render *bhū*-forms by many make-shift terms, or by *be*-forms.

Whatever the reason, it is certain that (a) a greatly increased use of *bhū*-forms, as compared with that in earlier literature, can be statistically shown; (b) this increase must be seen in the text, not the translations, to be realized. The one quasi-exception is Dr. R. E. Hume's *Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, where you can make the comparison by noting his "becomes" with the "is, are" or other words in, say, Max Müller's or Deussen's translations. Even he at times evades the 'become,' not always, I venture to think, with sufficient reason.

I would not be presumptuous here, who am off my special range, by claiming that the *bhū*-contexts always indicate the full force of 'becoming' as more or other than 'being'. Obviously, where the future tense is used, the meaning may be either 'will become' in the way of growth, or just 'will happen'; just as you might say in German "es wurde Nacht" for "night fell," or came on. Or, as in the Upanishad passage: "the wood of the fig-tree *bhavati* four-fold" - is split into four". Here is 'happening' apart from a matter of 'a becoming more' or 'expanding'. There is again the oft-repeated *tad api eṣo śloko bhavati*, which is usually rendered: "As to that there is this verse:..." and the speaker is inferred to have been quoting. As to this, the Pali idiom shows he may have been improvising, wishing to make

an impressive point, and feeling verse-creating afflatus. Then does the *bhavati* appear as the stronger form, he wanting to say "it comes over me";—a very genuine 'becoming'.

But when we have deducted all cases leaving room for doubt, far more than enough are left to show a new feature in Indian literature in this increase of *bhū*-forms. There will have been a reason for it just then and there, and it should be accounted for, as having stood for something new, something calling for expression, which had not been there before as so calling. If the word needed for that self-expression is there, it will be used; if it is not, make-shifts will be used. And because these will not be adequate, the ideas expressed by them will tend to get overlooked or misunderstood. Now the word needed was there, a much better word than any we have now left ourselves, we who in our old literature could speak of *wairthan weorthan*. Thus in our East Midland dialect:

Falled in dad welle-grund,
der he wurded heil and sund,
and cuned ut al newe.*

I would not belittle unnecessarily our 'become'; it is we who have suffered it to become ambiguous, perhaps at a period when we were not enough needing expression of growth. I am only saying, that the word needed then in India was there and, in taking to use it more than before, some new need of it was being felt.

* A *Bestiary*, 12th or 13th Century.

Let us take a few instances. In the old *Taittirīya Upanishad* is a little homily to the student: *mātrdevo bhava pitrdevo bhava*, etc. Here it is possible to translate: "Be one to whom mother is a god . . . to whom father is a god" and so for teacher and guest. Dr. Hume is here content with "Be one. . . ." But surely the teacher is seeking to make his pupil a better man, *a more* than he is; surely here is where "Become a mother-god-man" is a truer expression of what he is trying to bring about. Here the two verbs were there, be, become: *edhi bhava*, but only the latter is chosen. And here again, just previously, it is the teacher asking for himself: *amrtasya deva dhārāṇi bhūyāsam*: "May I, O God, become bearer of the immortal!" This time it is Deussen, who, as a German, had a word as strong as the Indian, and yet who renders this by: "May I be: moge ich Trager sein des Unsterblichen!" Surely he would have admitted that prayer is a reaching out to the divine will, willing to become *a more* than one just is! What a waste of a good word ready to hand! Or take this well-known passage on the dissolution at death of the bodily and mental complex: *kvāyaṁ tadā puruṣo bhavati*? "Where then becomes the man?" or, comes the man to be? In other words, where there-after does the coming (the very life of the very 'man') go on? Deussen makes the feeble rendering: "Wo bleibt dann der Mensch?" (Where remains the man?), losing all the force in the question. But

this was the case of a man who *wished*, in the interest as he saw it of Indian religion or philosophy, to evade the use of *werden*. This is patent in his annotations. One more instance: in the *Bṛihad-aranyaka Upanishad*, a man while in deep sleep, free, as being *himself* not body, to depart (in his other body) and enter other conditions, is thus described: "Then a father becomes not father, mother not mother," and so on for a number of relations which, for the brief interval, become invalid. Here again one would think that the *bhū*-form here were fitter rendered, as I have done, by a 'become'-form. Yet Max Müller's choice is, not 'become,' but 'is'.

The latent significance in *bhū*-forms becomes most impressive when we meet with what grammarians call the causative form. We have not, alas! this useful inflection. Sometimes we don't want it; 'place' is good for 'make stand'; 'drive', 'push', 'impel' serve for 'make go'. When we would have any one do, make, build etc. for us, our weakness becomes patent. Now the causative of *bhū*, which came to play so great a part in Buddhist diction, is very rare in the Upanishads, and so has it impressed translators that they have gone about to bring in such terms as "nourish" and "comfort" for "make—become!" Thus in the *Aitareya Upanishad*, the pregnant mother must be 'nourished,' when the original has *sā bhāvayitṛi bhāvayitavyā bhavati*: "the maker-to-become becomes one-who-is-to-be-made-become,—

as if the poet-teacher were playing with the pious idea of warding the wardress of man. Again, in the *Bhagavad-Gita* (III, 11): "Herewith make the devas become, and let them make thee become!" Dr. Barnett has translated with "Comfort ye the gods, and let the gods comfort you!" Against this, the choice of a very learned and poetically feeling master I am rash when I say, that "comfort" is but a secondary meaning of the causative *bhāv*-, and that it is possible we of the west have not sought to do justice to the literal first intention of the word. To make amends herein, let us picture more closely what "gods" had come to mean when the *Bhagavad-Gita* was taking its present, or next to present shape. We have to picture not a Vedic, scarcely even an Olympian background of 'gods' whom the sacrifice was to "comfort". We are coming to a world of brave and pious and splendid gentlemen, who are no more immune from the *samsāra* the wayfaring of lives and worlds than man himself, nay, who are themselves very man. We see

them as such warding man, and also being spiritually warded by elect men, in a mutual furthering of progress in that long wayfaring. If only we could in English express 'become' causatively with aesthetic effect, as could the Indian, we should not need to go afield for such a word as 'comfort'. The mutual 'making-to-become' making to grow, building up is truer, more direct, more impressive. You would get my meaning if only your, our age would wake up to discern the very 'man' who is not just mind, but who is just as capable of his 'coming-to-be' as is the earthly mind with its much shorter-lived growth.

Well, we cannot all of us check our translators' choosings, nor presume to correct. But it is hardly to be wondered at, that we outside readers have failed to see as yet, in the increased use of these *bhū*-forms, something that was pressing for utterance, pressing between the years B. C. 600 to 500. Can we now light upon that 'something' in the world of religious ideas and aspirations?

I surely think we can; thus:—

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS

[In the above article, the second instalment of which will appear in our next issue, Mrs. Rhys Davids shows the historical back-ground of the teachings of Gotama, the Buddha. There is another type of back-ground to which the following article of Prof. Bhagvat makes pointed reference. A conjoint study of the two articles is recommended.—EDS.]

THE LINE OF BUDDHAS

[N. K. Bhagvat, M. A., Fellow of the Bombay University and a Professor of Sanskrit and Pāli, who was invited by Patna University to lecture on the *Abhidhamma* in 1924-25, is a popular expounder of Buddhist lore on the platform and in the press. He is not only a Buddhist scholar but also a Buddhist by belief. His article brings to mind the words of H. P. Blavatsky that there existed an Elder Buddhism, which ante-dated the Vedic Ages. We print an extract on the subject on p. 296.—EDS.]

In Pāli Literature the doctrine of Dhammatā or the Law of unvarying operation under the existence of well-defined conditions has played such prominent part that even the doctrine of *Buddhattā* or Buddhahood has been reduced to a mechanical formula. In reducing things spiritual to the exactitude and accuracy of a mathematical Law, Buddhism tried to give equal opportunity to all, irrespective of any ulterior considerations of caste, colour or race, inferiority or superiority. Thus the Buddha was not like a Prophet, standing supremely high, unapproachable by none except the most fortunate, but one, who represented the culminating point in the all-sided development and perfection of humanity. Any one, who fulfilled those conditions, leading to full-enlightenment (*Bodhikāradhammās*), was entitled to attain to that most exalted position of Buddhahood. Thus in Buddhism not less than twenty-seven Buddhas, beside the Bhagavāna Gotama are mentioned. It was in fact a Line of the Buddhas to which Gotama belonged, and in this article an attempt is made to give an idea of the names and

a few details about these Buddhas.

Gotama himself has made a pointed reference to this race of the Buddhas in the *Nidāna Kathā*,* the story of the Nidānās (Epochs). This work is written by the celebrated commentator Buddhaghosa as an introduction to the *Jātakaatṭha-Kathā* or the commentary on the Jātakam. In this book Gotama is mentioned as visiting Kapilavatthu after his attainment, in the course of fulfilling his mission of spiritual regeneration. While passing through the streets of Kapilavatthu a-begging, he was seen by the servants of his father King Suddhodana; this news was too much for the latter to bear, and so he approached Gotama, and said:

"Sir, why do you put us to shame? Why do you go on a-begging? Is it not possible to get food to so many Bhikkhus?"

"This, Mahārāja," says Gotama, "is the custom of our Race!"

"I say, Sir, we belong to the illustrious Kshatriya race, and therein not even a single Kshatriya has maintained himself by begging his food!"

"This, Mahārāja, is your Royal line, but mine is *the line of the*

Buddhas, beginning from Dipankara down to Kassapa. These and other several thousands of Buddhas lived a life of Mendicancy!"* In this episode a distinct reference is made to the Buddhas. In the same work a detailed account of the twenty-four Buddhas, with only a passing reference to three Buddhas, before Dipankara, is given in prose.† In another Pāli work, entitled the *Buddhavamsa*, the history of the Buddhas from Dipankara down to Gotama is narrated in verse form.‡ In the *Nikāyas* proper or Collections of the Suttas, stray references to some of them are found. In the *Dīgha Nikāya*§ for example, mention is made and details are given of the last six Buddhas, viz., from Vipassi to Kassapa.

In the *Majjhima Nikāya*, references to Kakusandha and his disciple Sañjīva are made; but nowhere detailed and exhaustive accounts of these Buddhas are given excepting in the *Buddhavamsa* and the *Nidāna Kathā*. It is with the help of these two works, that belong to a Nikāya of Miscellaneous Works (*Khuddaka*) that the following information is presented.

Here is a list of the names of these Buddhas:

तण्हंकर, मेधंकर, सरणंकर, दीपंकर, कोण्डञ्ज (कौण्डिन्य), मंगल, सुमन, रेवत, सोभित, अनोमदस्सि, पदुम, नारद, पदुमुत्तर, सुमेध, सुजात, पियदस्सि, अत्थदस्सि, धम्मदस्सि, सिद्धत्थ, तिस्स,

कुस्स, विपस्सि, सिखि, वेस्सभू, ककुसन्ध, कोणागमन, कस्सप.

Taṇhankara, Medhankara, Sarāṇankara, Dipankara, Koṇḍañña (sk. Koundiyya), Mangala, Sumana, Revata, Sobhita, Anomadassi, Paduma, Nārada, Padumuttara, Sumedha, Sujāta, Piyadassi, Atthadassi, Dhammadassi, Siddhattha, Tissa, Phussa, Vipassi, Sikhi, Vessabhu, Kakusandha, Koṇāgamana, Kassapa.‡

In this list, there is no detailed mention of the first three, since Gotama got recognition as a Future Buddha (*Bodhisattva*) from Dipankara Buddha, and the three had preceded Dipankara. Our Future Buddha in his passage of time through four immensities and a hundred thousand world-cycles to the present time had expressed his wish for Buddhahood under twenty-four of these Buddhas. The following details are given with reference to these Buddhas: the name of the Buddha; his assemblies; the caste to which he belonged (not necessarily given in respect of each); the capital, to which he first belonged; the name of his father; that of his mother; his two chief male disciples (*aggasāvakas*), his personal attendant Bhikkhu (*Upatthāka*); his two chief female disciples (*aggasāvikas*); the tree, under which he attained Buddhahood; the height of his body and lastly, the period of his life. For example, take Dipankara Buddha himself: He had *three* assemblies: The first consisting of 100,000 koṭis; the second of 100 koṭis; and the third

* Vide: *Nidāna Kathā*, Section 150.

† *Ibid*: Sections 39-71.

‡ P. T. S. Edition, Ed. Morris, 1882.

§ *Mahāpadāna Sutta*.

¶ Vide: *Nidāna Kathā*, Section 71.

of 90,000 kotis. He belonged to the Warrior Caste (*Khattiya*). His capital was named Rammavati. His father's name was Sudeva, and mother's Sumedhā. His two chief male disciples were Sumangala and Tissa. His personal attendant (Bhikkhu) was Sāgata. His two chief female disciples were Nandā and Sunandā. The Bodhi tree, under which he attained Buddhahood was Pippalī. His height was eighty spans (*hattha*) and his length of life was 100,000 years!

In this wise, details are given of the remaining Buddhas. It would be profitless to give these in a tabular form. We shall try, however, to give certain peculiarities in respect of each item of detail, connected with a few of these Buddhas. Turning to the *Assemblies* of Bhikkhus or Shrāvākas, we discover fabulous figures of Kotis or 100,000 and almost in a majority of cases there are mentioned three assemblies. In the case of Kakusandha, Koṇāgamana and Kassapa, however, there is stated only *one* assembly, as belonging to *each*: 40,000, 30,000, 20,000 respectively. To a critical mind, these figures certainly would sound extravagant. Looking next to the *caste*, to which these several Buddhas belonged, we find therein mention made of the Brāhmaṇa and the Warrior castes only. The Vaishya and the Shūdra castes seem not to have produced Buddhas! Koṇāgamana and Kassapa, for instance belonged to the Brāhmaṇa caste; Tissa, Vipassi, Sumana and others were

Khattiyas. As regards the *Cities*, familiar names like Kāsī and Barāṇasī are there; but others like Uttara, Khema, Sudhaññivati, Candravati, Hansāvatī, Bandhumatī or Sobhavatī, are romantic and not traceable on our map.

In the list of names of the *Fathers*—Sunanda, Uttara, Sudhamma, Sudatta, Ananda, Sumedha, Jayasena, Sudinna, Aggidatta, Yaññadatta, Brahma-datta, are met with; while among the *Mothers*, names like Sujātā, Sirimā, Vipulā, Anomā, Asamā, Candā, Sudassanā, Visākhā, Pabhāvatī, Dhanavatī are noticeable. Among *two male disciples* of *each Buddha*, pairs like, Bhadda and Sunanda, Varuṇa and Brahmadeva, Sāla and Upasāla, Soṇa and Uttara, Sambala and Vasumitta, Tissa and Bhāradwāja are mentioned. The names of Varuṇa, Brahmadeva, Sambala, and Bhāradwāja deserve attention. An *Upatthāka* or *personal* attendant Bhikkhu is an important office, since the Bhikkhu had always to be near the Master. In a list of these, names like Pālita, Udena, Sambhava, Varuṇa, Vāsetṭha Khemankara, Asoka, Sabbamitta, are met with. Among the names of the *two female chief disciples*, pairs like Sivalī and Asokā, Soṇā and Upasoṇā, Sundarī and Sumanā, Rāmā and Surāmā, Dhammā and Sudhammā, Calā and Acalā, Subhadda and Uttarā are striking. The very fact that, like male disciples, Buddhism confers the distinction of being the chief on *female disciples* also proves that the

equality of sexes had been fully accepted.

In the list of *Trees*, that have received the honour of being *Bodhi-trees*, (knowledge-giving Trees), Sāla, Nāga, Ajjuna (Arjuna), Mahānīpa, Piyaṅgu, Campaka, Āmalaka, Pātālī, Nigrodha, Assattha (Aswastha), Udumbara, Sirīsa, and Kaṇikāra, are noticeable. As in all ages, trees have been held in high reverence, some of these names may throw light on the beliefs of the people of India in times past. As regards the *height* of these Buddhas, and their longevity, the figures look incredible. The *height* varying between 80 and 20 spans (*hattha*) and the length of life between 100,000 and 20,000 years! With this longevity, how can one complain of the shortness and impermanence of life?

Such are a few of the details of that *Vamsa* or the line of the Buddhas, to which Gotama belonged. These Buddhas begged their food, and in this life of mendicancy, they carried on the work of regeneration and moral progress. Buddhas represent the perfection of Personality, *par excellence*, and we have attempted

to show that in this eternal march of time many Buddhas or supremely perfected Personalities must have existed and worked for the betterment of living creation.

The student of Comparative Religions will find herein much food for thought, as behind the appearance of these extravagant and astonishing details, there lies this grand truth—that greatness, unalloyed self-sacrifice, wonderful sincerity of purpose, untiring zeal for their mission and all-embracing love and compassion characterise these mighty Personalities of hoary antiquity. It is the liberal and catholic mind alone that will be able to see these essentials, after sifting them from the mass of non-essentials. It is in order to teach humanity to distinguish the essentials from the non-essentials, that these Buddhas appear in this World; it is the absence of such knowledge, that brings in its train all the ills of life. The Buddhas appear and disappear to the ordinary vision, but their infinite knowledge continues to exist and help all men according to the unfailing operation of the Law of Karma.

N. K. BHAGVAT

FREE WILL AND MODERN PSYCHOLOGY

[Prof. C. E. M. Joad examines the position assigned to Will by modern psychology in the light of Plato and Schopenhauer, who were greatly influenced by eastern wisdom. Professor G. R. Malkani, head of the Indian Institute of Philosophy has promised to present the Indian view of the subject next month.—EDS.]

The teaching of most modern psychology is—it is common knowledge—inimical to the freedom of the will. The threat to freedom comes from two quarters. On the one hand, psycho-analysis exhibits the dependence of all conscious faculties, including the conscious will, upon trends in the unconscious. Consciousness is seen to be a mere cork tossing on the unconscious waves of impulse and desire, and the faculties upon which we most pride ourselves, which we regard, in fact as the differentiating characteristics of our species, reason and will, are represented as servants of fundamentally irrational and uncontrollable elements in our nature, reason inventing grounds for thinking that what we instinctively wish to believe is true, and, will, duping us into the belief that what we instinctively want to do is right. On the other, the new physiological psychology exhibits all mental occurrences as the functions of bodily occurrences. I think and will as I do because my body behaves as it does. Increasing knowledge of the part played by the ductless glands in determining character, coupled with the work of Pavlov on conditioned reflexes, has considerably strengthened this mode of interpretation, with the

result that Behaviourism is probably the strongest single movement in psychology to-day.

In these circumstances it seems appropriate to indicate some of the grounds upon which the position of those who believe in free will rests. The freedom of the will can, of course, be advocated and has in fact been advocated from many standpoints. Of these one of the most important is that adopted in Hindu philosophy. I am not myself competent to expound the contribution which Indian thought has made to the problem, but it happens to be the case that on this issue, more, perhaps, than on any other, the thought of the East has affected the views of Western philosophers.

I propose, therefore, in the first place to illustrate this traditional conception of freedom, the conception of Hindu philosophy, from the work of two philosophers of the West, Plato and Schopenhauer. Secondly, to indicate what in the light of modern philosophy may be regarded as the minimum assumptions which are required for the freedom of the will.

I

Plato's doctrine will be found in the celebrated myth of Er, at the end of the tenth book of the

Republic. The myth of Er is a vision of the soul's fate after death. Er is taken to a spot to which the souls proceed immediately after death to be judged. There are two streams of souls, the first travelling to heaven or hell for a thousand years of bliss or punishment according to their deserts, the second returning after their sojourn in heaven or hell to choose a new life on earth. The choice which the souls make is the all-important crisis in their history. Into it there enter two factors, one of necessity, the second, that of freedom. In the first place, the order in which the souls choose is determined for them by lot; herein is the element of chance. But, secondly, however late in the order a soul gets its choice, it still has a choice, so that even the soul that chooses last, when all the best available lives might be considered to have already been snapped up, may still, provided it chooses wisely, obtain a life worth having. Once the soul has made its choice of life, it has chosen its destiny; thus a man's own will becomes his destiny in the sense that he can never reverse what he has once chosen or the consequences of his choice. Moreover, in making his choice his will is influenced although never determined by his past life and past choices. For example, souls who have spent a thousand years in Purgatory generally return the wiser for what they have undergone, so that they choose a humble life of wisdom and good works rather than a life of glory and power. Con-

versely the enjoyment of a thousand years of bliss sometimes leads a soul to make a worse choice than it otherwise would have done. In another dialogue the *Phaedrus* we are told that, if a soul after the enjoyment of bliss makes a wise choice and continues to do so on successive occasions, living better in each life and becoming better through repeated sojourns in heaven, it escapes at last the necessity of putting on a material body and, freed from the necessity of further choice, remains a pure soul.

Four points may be emphasised in this doctrine. The first three are determinist. First, circumstances (in the myth the circumstance of the lot) influence choices; secondly, a choice once made determines one's destiny and is irrevocable. Thirdly, a choice is not only limited by circumstances but influenced by the past history of the chooser. The purport of the myth of Er is to insist that what is done by the soul upon earth has a direct effect upon its future. Thus the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, involving, as it does, the continuity of its existence, adds to our moral responsibility and increases the importance of living rightly. The concluding words of the *Republic* emphasize the fact that the one thing needful is to study how to make oneself better and wiser, not only for this life but in order that, when one's turn comes to choose another, one may make a correct choice for the future. Life on earth, in fact, is, rightly regarded,

a process of learning and training for that future. The fourth point emphasizes the fact of freedom. In spite of all that has been said the choice of the soul *really is free*; the past, influences and inclines but never necessitates its choice.

Plato, so far as I know, was not directly influenced by the teaching of the East, to which it is improbable that he had access. Nevertheless it is difficult to avoid being struck by the resemblance between this account of freedom and that of Hindu philosophy. Those who are better acquainted with that philosophy than I am will be able to judge how close that resemblance is.

The philosophy of Schopenhauer is admittedly influenced by Eastern Philosophy. For him the reality of things is Will. This is conceived as a universal unconscious urge or thrust, objectified at different levels in living individuals. It is known to us through internal perception, which Schopenhauer calls intuition. Introspect yourself, attend to the actual processes of your own consciousness, he seems to say, and you will establish contact not only with the reality of your ego, but with the fundamental reality of the universe, since this reality of the universe, the Will, is that which, objectified in you, forms the core of your being.

The conception in Schopenhauer's hands issues in the pessimism for which he is most celebrated. The Will, being from its very nature a restless, dynamic flux, expresses itself in human beings

as a series of wants and desires. Wanting is a pain and impels us to make efforts to satisfy it. Satisfaction brings pleasure, but this is of necessity fleeting and momentary, since, being dependent upon the satisfaction of the preceding state of need, pleasure cannot persist after the need is satisfied; for the Will, unable to rest in satisfaction, replaces the satisfied need by a new one. Thus those who make self-satisfaction their aim and seek to live a life of pleasure doubly err. In the first place, they endeavour to enjoy that which from its very nature is dependent upon a preceding want or need without undergoing the pain of want upon which it depends; in the second, they endeavour to make permanent that which by its very nature is transitory, overlooking the fact that what is customary is no longer felt as a pleasure. Satisfaction can never be more than deliverance from pain, and it is want, therefore, and not satisfaction that appears as the central fact of life.

So far the analysis is not very different from that of modern psychology, and its implications are equally deterministic. The impulses of the Will are blind; we have, or so it seems, no choice but to obey them, and, since obedience brings only momentary satisfaction, life considered as a transaction in pleasure and pain is bound to be a failure. For, so long as the Will is affirmed, so long are evil and suffering affirmed; yet the root of all life is a Will, and we exist by willing.

We seem here to reach an im-

passe from which there is no escape. Schopenhauer nevertheless suggests two. The first is by art. Art is conceived as essentially contemplative. The artist has the faculty of continuing in a state of pure perception, of losing his personality in this perception, and of enlisting in its service the knowledge and harnessing the energy of the will. The Will is still affirmed, but it is affirmed not in pursuance of the individual's own aims and interests, but for the renunciation of his personality in contemplation of the world. The escape here is from the circle of personal wants and desires to disinterested knowledge. In art we know and enjoy without wishing to have that which we enjoy.

Similarly there is an escape through ethics. In working out his ethical system Schopenhauer was deeply influenced by Indian philosophy; with the philosophers of Buddhism he identified the end of existence with release from slavery to the impulses of the Will, and proclaimed the practice of asceticism as the best method of achieving such release. The disposition of mind which alone leads to true holiness and to deliverance from desire, finds expression in renunciation of the world. The stage of holiness is ultimately achieved through a denial of the Will to live. Since the energy for this denial can only be supplied by the Will, the Will must be turned against itself. Attaining to a vision of the real nature of life, realising the vain striving, the

incessant suffering, the ever recurring desire which it involves, he who would achieve holiness turns away from life to achieve in the end a state of resignation which is the result of voluntary renunciation.

Thus the loftiest goodness consists in the transcendence of desire, and the freedom of the Will is most completely demonstrated in the negation of willing. Whatever we may think of the paradox in which it ends, we must recognise that the whole structure of Schopenhauer's philosophy is built upon a foundation of freedom. He does not merely say that we can be free; he says that we *are* free in virtue of our nature as expressions of the fundamental principle or reality of the universe, which is itself a principle of freedom, being a spontaneous, dynamic will. And if it be objected that this implies freedom for the universe rather than the individual Schopenhauer answers that the individual can himself become free, free, even of the Will by using the dynamic energy of the Will to turn it against itself in contemplation in art and renunciation in ethics.

II

What comfort may we legitimately derive from these doctrines in the light of the contentions of modern psychology? From the hints dropped in Plato two facts emerge. First, a man's choice once made is irrevocable; it determines his destiny in respect of that which he has chosen, and

must needs, therefore, influence all future choices. As the Eastern view puts it, a man having chosen is bound to feel the effects of his choice from the causes he has himself set in motion. Every time a man chooses evil his character is determined by the fact of his choice, and this determination makes it easier for him to choose evil, and make it harder to choose good on the next occasion on which a choice presents itself. In this sense, then, it is true that our choices in determining our actions determine also our characters, and to that extent influence our future choices.

But, and this is the second point, they never necessitate them. Although it becomes harder for me to choose good each time I choose evil, it never becomes impossible. For choice is always free, and no amount of choosing in the past, although it may bias and influence, can ever necessitate a present choice.

One of the best treatments of the subject of Free Will with which I am acquainted is that of St. Thomas Aquinas. The great difficulty in the conception of freedom is that choice is never without a motive, the motive, let us say, to have A rather than B, and the motive may, and often is said to determine the choice. How, then, can the choice be free? The essence of St. Thomas's account is that while I am deliberating between A and B, making a comparison of their respective "goodnesses" on which my act of choice will depend, there is a

definite stage of indecision, a period in which I am "indetermined to either alternative". When the comparison is finished and the estimate 'A is better than B' is made, the period of indetermination is over; my will is now *determined*, determined, that is, to take A and leave B, and what it is determined by is my own judgment of their relative worths. Now in making this judgment it is admitted that I shall be influenced by all the factors upon which modern psychology lays stress, by the violence of present desires, the persistence of prejudice, the effects of past habits, the drive of unconscious impulses and, as Plato insists, the bias arising from the sum total of my choices in the past; nor is it contended that it is easy to eliminate the influence of all these factors. But what is necessary as a minimum condition of freedom of choice are the admissions first, that the elimination is sometimes achieved, that we do sometimes make an *impartial* comparative judgment of the relative worths of two goods of which we cannot have both; and choose in accordance with our judgment; and second, that what is achieved sometimes can in theory be achieved always.

Can the admissions be made? I think that they can, but only if we are prepared to accept a metaphysical hypothesis such as that of Schopenhauer, which asserts that the Will, or, as I should prefer to call it, Life is an active spontaneous dynamic principle; to say in fact, that it is really crea-

tive in the sense that it can bring something out of nothing. For it is precisely this that Plato's contention that, although biassed by past choices we can nevertheless make new ones which are not determined, Schopenhauer's view that, although we are normally corks bobbing on the waves of impulse and desire which are the Will, we can turn the Will against itself, and the affirmation of Hindu philosophy that, although we are influenced by the force of past Karma, we can ourselves mould

that force, can in fact make our own Karma, imply. In other words, the doctrine of free will implies a metaphysical view of reality as itself freedom, with the corollary that that freedom is objectified in our own wills. To reason about the matter is to be convinced by the cogency of the arguments that make for determinism. It is only to a faculty of intuitive apprehension, to our consciousness of the fundamental character of our own experience in choosing, that the fact of freedom is revealed.

C. E. M. JOAD

WILL

In metaphysics and occult philosophy, Will is that which governs the manifested universes in eternity. Will is the one and sole principle of abstract eternal MOTION, or its ensouling essence. "The will," says Van Helmont, "is the first of all powers . . . The will is the property of all spiritual beings and displays itself in them the more actively the more they are freed from matter." And Paracelsus teaches that "determined will is the beginning of all magical operations. It is because men do not perfectly imagine and believe the result, that the (occult) arts are so uncertain, while they might be perfectly certain". Like all the rest, the Will is *septenary* in its degrees of manifestation. Emanating from the one, eternal, abstract and purely quiescent Will (Ātmā in Layam), it becomes Buddhi in its Alaya state, descends lower as Mahat (Manas), and runs down the ladder of degrees until the divine Eros becomes, in its lower, animal manifestation, *erotic* desire. Will as an eternal principle is neither spirit nor substance but everlasting ideation. As well expressed by Schopenhauer in his *Parerga*, "in sober reality there is neither *matter* nor *spirit*. The tendency to gravitation in a stone is as unexplainable as thought in the human brain. . . . If matter can—no one knows why—fall to the ground, then it can also—no one knows why—think. . . . As soon, even in mechanics, as we trespass beyond the purely mathematical, as soon as we reach the inscrutable adhesion, gravitation, and so on, we are faced by phenomena which are to our senses as mysterious as the WILL".

—H. P. BLAVATSKY (*Glossary*)

THE RESURRECTION OF THE PAST

[**Ralph Van Deman Magoffin** is the President of the Archaeological Institute of America and Head of the Department of Classics of the New York University. In this article he describes how the life and culture of past civilizations have now become living realities. More than ever they call the expert builders of our modern world to acknowledge the vast superiority of their ancient sires. What was said in 1877 is even more true to-day; H. P. Blavatsky then wrote: "The more archaeology and philosophy advance, the more humiliating to our pride are the discoveries which are daily made, the more glorious testimony do they bear in behalf of those who, perhaps on account of the distance of their remote antiquity, have been until now considered ignorant flounders in the deepest mire of superstition."

No longer can the modern world talk of savage superstitions; to-day it marvels and stands awed in the presence of ancient works of beauty—but is even that sufficient? What ideals inspired the rulers, the instructors, the builders of old compared to whom our kings, educators and architects are but pigmies?—EDS.]

To resurrect the past is to raise either the dead or the presumably dead. The spirit of the past is very much alive as art, and philosophy, law, and literature show in their own acknowledgment of tradition. The not long distant past lives in physiognomy, in habits, in racial and family certainties. What is here under discussion however is the resurrection of the distant, the classic, the supposedly unreclaimable past.

The heavenward pointing pyramids and the Sphinx of the valley of the Nile have never been lost to view. They have always been mysterious indices to an Egyptian civilization long since supposedly dead, for the sketchy accounts in Herodotus and in various of the Roman writers gave an inkling only even of these ephemeral characteristics of life which always die from recurrent change. It was not until 1799 that there occurred the accidental discovery of a stone, called the Rosetta Stone because it was

found at the Rosetta mouth of the Nile, on which were engraved three inscriptions. One was in undecipherable hieroglyphic, one in a shorthand variety of the hieroglyphic, the demotic, but the third was in Greek, a language still alive and known. It took years of the trial and error method before the guess that the inscriptions were a trilingual triplicate could be proved. Before many years more had passed, the wealth of the unknown stories of Egyptian antiquity which covered the sides of obelisks, temples, and sarcophagi, had repaid a thousand-fold the interest of the world, avid for the resurrection of the culture and civilization of the great nation that had "lived, moved, and had its being" in the fertile valley of the Nile.

During the century or more since the decipherment of the hieroglyphics on the Rosetta Stone not only the historical facts desired, but Egyptian life in its varied forms have become part and

parcel of the world's increasing knowledge. The pyramids were entered and explored; mastabas, i.e., tombs of the nobility, were found buried in the sand, their mummified occupants surrounding their Pharaoh in his pyramid tomb even as they had surrounded him in life.

Later, another type of royal tomb was found far up the Nile in the sides of the cliffs. At the end of long passages cut back into the rock the Pharaohs of later dynasties came again to light and became personages whose life, whose religious thoughts and fears, and whose wealth and power could be estimated and evaluated. In other tombs were found figurines of artisans, overseers, slaves, and animals, all in miniature, and performing, as in a puppet show, the tasks which in life those whom they represented had performed.

The resurrection of Tutankhamen however was the *tour de force* of archaeologists in Egypt. To bring again to life, except that in his case it is to a life that will now last forever, the last of the Pharaohs, and the one Pharaoh whose tomb had never been disturbed, was nothing short of a stupendous event. No other single find has matched it in international interest. The great gesso-gilt sarcophagus which contained other smaller sarcophagi, among which was one, the walls of which were of solid gold; the marvellous sarcophagus of pink alabaster, unique in all the world; the plethora of funerary equipment,

the splendid throne chair and the ecclesiastical chair, or faldstool, the chests full of articles in gold, silver, ivory, ebony, set with precious and semi-precious gems, and carved or decorated in the best style of the period: these were a treasure trove indeed which have enriched and illuminated the thus resurrected life of the time of Tutankhamen.

The fertile valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates which we usually call Mesopotamia, teemed with life in the five or six millennia B. C. Of Persians, of Assyrians, of Babylonians, we knew but the Akkadians and the Sumerians were buried beneath the remains of those later civilizations. Archaeologists have but recently resurrected these very ancient people from their long forgotten tombs, and they now live and dwell among us in historic reality. Harps of ten and twelve strings, that date thousands of years B. C. surprise us with the certainty that music in those long gone days had reached a pitch that transcended in variety the simple octave of to-day. The skeletal remains and the wonderful head-dress of Queen Shub-Ad, found broken in hundreds of pieces of its thin gold and gem-encrusted delicacy, and the courtiers lying in serried rank on the tomb floor, brought most vividly to life the picture of the power over life and death of a ruler—one of many—whose very name had seemingly been lost in oblivion. When the expedition from the Field Museum in Chicago discovered the

copper-rimmed wheels of the oldest chariot in the world, the imagination at once saw as clearly as in life the chariots of ancient days rolling in triumph or to war. The recent discovery of a seven-foot stratum of riverine deposit with not a single artifact in it, and below which are pieces of broken pottery, and above which are thousands of unbroken pots and other objects like the broken ones below, has stirred the religious world; for the claim has been made, and with much probability of success, that the riverine deposit is that laid down by the Flood mentioned in the Old Testament, and perhaps, the very one of which many traditions of great floods of those early days are well known.

To resurrect a civilization like that in Crete which had entirely disappeared or been forgotten would seem almost to strain the bounds of credibility. Yet that is what archæology had done. Americans, Italians, and Greeks may be allowed some of the credit, but to Arthur Evans, now Sir Arthur Evans, of England must go the lion's share.

Ancient Egypt was lost under shifting sand, and Mesopotamia was buried in flood-mud and sand. The story of the Trojan war guaranteed settlements in Asia Minor and in continental Greece. But between Egypt and Mesopotamia and historic Greece there was a great and inexplicable gap. When Evans found the palace of the legendary Minos at Cnossus in Crete, and when other Cretan sides of places of great

ancient power came to light, and when the ceramists classified Cretan pottery in sequences that ran from 3000 to 1400 B.C., the Minoan Civilization, a great sea power in the early Ægean, rose, first like a wraith, and then growing to be a living archæological organism of flesh and blood, and filled that historical gap with a third world power, contemporaneous with the two already known. The palace at Cnossus with its water system, its bath tubs of porcelain, its lower chambers full of great *pithoi* for the storage of grain, oil, and treasure, its marvellous painted walls with contemporaneous scenes of the life of the court, these and many other things, resurrected an entirely forgotten culture to its proper place in the historical life of the ancient world. The Phaestos disk offered its problem on early language, the Greek text of Cretan law on the stones of the mill-dam at Gortyna, the fauna and flora painted on hundreds of Cretan vases, gave surroundings and atmosphere and undoubted reality to that wonderful island that shuts the Ægean off from the Mediterranean, that island which may well have contained the civilization—forgotten by the Greeks which inhabited the long lost isle of Atlantis. Plato must have known the legends and the tradition, and oddly enough his description of Atlantis as one comes to it from the north is strangely like the horizon view of Crete to-day, as one comes down to it from Athens or the north.

One may read in the Scriptures of Jerusalem that "the Amorite was thy father, and thy mother a Hittite," that Jebus (Jerusalem) was a brother of Heth, and that Uriah the Hittite lived at Jerusalem. But no one imagined that the Hittites were other than one of the many small tribes that lived in tiny Palestine. But in Egyptian and Mesopotamian history a people, whose name in general we may write as Hatti, began to loom large. Suddenly the archæological world was electrified by the announcement of the discovery of a great town of the Hatti in the bend of the Halys river in Anatolia, in and under the modern Turkish town of Boghaz-Keui. It turned out to be the capital of the ancient Hittites, and in it were found the answers, inscribed in Mesopotamian cuneiform letters, to diplomatic correspondence already found in Egypt. Explorers and archæologists began to find scores of Hittite towns and monuments all over Anatolia, and an Hittite Empire was suddenly resurrected from the limbo of the past. Only a few of the Hittite sites have been partially excavated, but over a thousand are now known, and are marked for future archæological work. Alongside the Minoan civilization another culture has been resurrected into historical life, and takes its place as the fourth great world power of Near East antiquity with Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Crete.

In Greece, the British at Mycenæ and Sparta have brought

to light and life older civilization than was known. The American School at Athens has resurrected ancient Corinth, and has just begun on what may prove to be the most important work ever done in Greece. It is laying bare the ancient *agora*, or market place, of Athens. From the inscriptions alone which are almost sure to be found, military, commercial, and diplomatic documents will restore to historic certainty much of the workings of government, and of international treaties, of which we are unaware, and which will give us a much more complete picture of ancient Greece. Robinson of John Hopkins has resurrected ancient Olynthus, the town destroyed by Philip, the father of Alexander the Great.

In the Italy the discoveries are almost legion. The early Christians have been resurrected from the Catacombs; we have become acquainted with every one of the Roman emperors and empresses from their portraits in discovered statues or in coins dug from the ground. We know how the early Roman cast his "Australian," or secret, ballot, because it is stamped pictorially on a series of silver *denarii*. The daily life of the Romans from birth to death is absolutely guaranteed to us in historical relief sculpture, in thousands of square yards of wall paintings, and in actual objects also, such as silver dinner services, tools and weapons and kitchen implements, in beds and tables and lead water pipe.

As much as has been known from history, so much more is now so fully illustrated by archaeological finds that the Greeks and Romans actually live for us to-day in almost more lively verity than they themselves lived.

Scoffing had no effect on the beliefs of a young German boy named Heinrich Schliemann, whose reading of Homer had fired him with a belief in Troy, and Helen of Troy, and Agamemnon, Achilles, Hector, and Aeneas. When he had finally made money enough he went to Asia Minor near the entrance to the Dardanelles, and found the Troy which he had been told was nothing more than a lively piece of Greek imagination. Then he found in the Peloponnesus in Greece, Mycenæ the golden city of King Agamemnon, and Tiryns the strong fortress of his predecessors in Argive rank. The world stopped laughing at Schliemann for he had resurrected from a doubted story the reality that lay at the base of what we now know is the history of part of the great struggle of the invading Indo-European Hellenes against the Mediterranean peoples who had inhabited the Ægean

lands for millennia, and who were the builders of the Minoan, and its late flower, the Mycenaean civilizations. Andromache and Astyanax, so beautifully made alive for us by the sculptor Edward Valentine of Virginia, Aeneas whom Virgil made one of the great characters of a superb epic, Ajax, and Ulysses and his faithful Penelope, the charming princess Nausicaa, Achilles and Patroclus, Menelaus, Helen, and Paris, Priam and Hector, Laocoon and Sinon, all these are more alive to-day than many people who have not yet died.

And the resurrections yet to come! The Indus, the Brahmaputra, and the Ganges in India have deep under the fertile soil that lines their banks, unguessed civilizations of splendour that will some day be brought to the light and life of historical day. Coming events cast their shadows before and such are the great early civilizations uncovered by Sir John Marshall at the sites of Harappa and Mohenjo-daro.

The resurrection of the ancient past is the work of one of the now liveliest—and liveliest—of modern sciences.

RALPH VAN DEMAN MAGOFFIN

FIVE LIGHTS AT THE CROSS ROADS

II. APOLLONIUS OF TYANA

[Geoffrey West is presenting five biographical studies of mystics and miracle-workers who lived about the first century A.D. In our March number he wrote on "Ptolemy Soter"; the next one on "Simon Magus" will appear in our July issue.—Eds.]

Three hundred years after the death of Ptolemy, Serapis had become but one more god, though a powerful one, among the many, and upon the Museum had fallen the shadow of pedantry. Yet Alexandria flourished, other more vital schools had arisen, and the Library remained a centre for students from all over the known civilised world. Rome had usurped the power of Greece. Men were free not only to worship what gods they would but also to travel in quest of new knowledge. After many centuries, perhaps millenniums, direct contact with the wisdom of the East was being tentatively re-established. Alexandria played its part. It was the gateway between East and West. It had its Indian merchants, its Indian colony even. The Library, almost certainly, held its treasure of Indian manuscripts. And beckoned by these suggestions, rarely wise men, like Apollonius of Tyana, would follow in the footsteps of Pythagoras towards India itself, returning with authority in bearing and voice, the power to work those wonders which ignorance alone miscalled miracle, and a knowledge that might be spoken only to those worthy to receive it.

The modernist attitude to Apollonius is simple—even ingenuous. Western science, scanning the reports of an ability beyond its own, would declare him mainly if not entirely legendary. Christianity, treading more warily on dangerous ground, would label him at least impostor, and indeed if the point is insisted upon, the principal sources of his history have as dubious an origin as some of the Christian gospels themselves. Apollonius had been dead well over a hundred years when Philostratus constructed his account from such information as was open to him, principally the note-books of his subject's disciple, Damis. Moreover, Philostratus anticipated in many ways the methods of modern biography; he embroidered where the material ran thin, and where gaps appeared he invented to the best of his practised ability. Yes, scepticism is easy, and yet there is a wiser way—to take this Apollonius, to study him for what he is worth, and to let the imagination declare what in him be false or true.

He was born in Cappadocia, at Tyana, probably about the close of the first decade of the Christian era. The first settled

date in his life is the year 66, when he was exiled from Rome with other philosophers who spoke too frankly against Nero's tyrannies, but at this time he cannot have been less than fifty, and may well have been more. His parents were wealthy, but he early revealed an ascetic, studious nature, and his intellectual ability was as marked as his physical beauty. At fourteen he went to Tarsus, the nearest centre of learning, but the schools proved academic, and he journeyed on to Ægae, on the sea-coast, there taking up his residence among the priests of the temple of Æsculapius, and studying under Platonic, Stoic, Peripatetic, and Epicurean teachers, learning the Phœnician sciences from Euthydemus, and the Pythagorean, from Euxenus of Heraclea. Everywhere he found more bewilderment and inquiry than any sure knowledge. Paganism, having left unheeded the lesson of Serapis, was dying of inanition, and in the absence of new impulse religion for the greater number degenerated into superstition, a mere wonder-seeking. A truer spirit survived, mainly within the temples and among those who went to live apart in religious communities. The Pythagoreans in particular were known for their pure, ascetic lives, and to their discipline and their study Apollonius finally inclined. From youth he followed their rule to eat no meat and drink no wine, to wear only linen and leave the hair uncut, and when at twenty he inherited his father's wealth he

gave it freely away to a brother and other needing relatives. He took a vow of five years' silence, and later as a teacher imposed a similar test upon all who sought to be his intimate pupils.

The next twenty years were spent in continuous travel about the Near East from temple to temple, community to community, exchanging his wisdom with such as were worthy, and gathering about him a little group of disciples who revered him as a teacher of the hidden way. He was in his middle forties when he set out for India, saying to his pupils who sought to dissuade him: "Since you are faint-hearted, I bid you farewell. As for myself I must go whithersoever wisdom and my inner self may lead me. The Gods are my advisers and I can but rely on their counsels." Thus he went alone until Damis, meeting him on the way, recognised his knowledge and holiness, and begged to share with him the burden and danger of the way. He returned eventually by way of Babylon and Greece to Rome; then, banished by Nero, journeyed on to Spain, crossed over to North Africa, and came by a devious route to Alexandria, where he met the future emperor Vespasian in 68 or 69. Thence he travelled up the Nile to spend probably some years with a religious community in Ethiopia.

He next appears in Alexandria during the visit of Titus in 80 or 81. Followed another decade of travel and teaching, until in 93 he was called to Rome to be

tried for denouncing the tyrant Domitian. He was acquitted by Domitian himself, and established his school at Ephesus, where there occurred three years later a famous instance of his visionary powers. He was delivering a philosophical address to a large audience, when he seemed to lose the thread of his discourse. He paused, stared intently before him, and cried in a loud voice: "Strike the tyrant, strike!" He then informed his astonished pupils of Domitian's assassination, though the news did not otherwise reach the city for several days. It is not known where, or even how, Apollonius died. The faithful Damis, being sent by him to Rome, returned to find him unaccountably gone. It is only a modern writer's suggestion that he might perhaps have rejoined his Indian teachers.

Whatever the fact of that, clearly the Indian visit was his life's turning-point. What came before led up to it; what followed derived from it. It is therefore unfortunate, however inevitable, that we learn so little of his actual contact with the Hindu Sages, but rather perhaps should we be grateful for even the little we have, for such a silence persists at the hearts of the records of all great teachers—and possibly too we should attribute our dissatisfaction to our own ignorance, for some learned ones would declare the whole account of the Indian journey the allegorical representation of the trials of a neophyte! In any case it is only what we

should expect, for Damis was far from being an initiate, and was compelled to remain behind in the palace of a hospitable king while his master went onward to the home of the Sages. For his subsequent questioning Damis received little more than cryptic replies: "I saw men dwelling on the earth and yet not on it, defended on all sides, yet without any defence, and yet possessed of nothing but what all possess." The interpretation of this—that being concerned with spiritual things they were raised above material attack by the development of powers inherent in all—is confirmed in their statements to Apollonius that they were gods because they were good men, "omniscient just because we begin with self-knowledge; none of us may approach this philosophy of ours until he know himself first of all". Few things are in fact clearer in the life of Apollonius than that his so-called magical powers grew only with his own self-knowledge and purification. In his youth he had to master foreign languages like any one else; only gradually did he learn to read the thoughts of men directly, and only after his Indian initiation could he work those wonders, ascribed to all great teachers, which reveal him a philosopher in the Pythagorean sense of one intimate with nature's higher laws. On leaving the Sages he told them: "I will continue to enjoy your conversation as if still with you."

He returned from India as one

whose mission was now assured. Who, a priest of Alexandria asked him, was wise enough to reform the religion of the Egyptians, and he replied: "Any Sage who comes from the Indians." Later, recalling to the Ethiopian Gymnosophists the ancient eastern origin of their doctrines, and urging them to follow his own adopted rule of life and discipline of silence, he spoke clearly as one having authority:

But if you endure this ordeal, hear now your reward: temperance and righteousness shall be yours unbidden; you shall reckon no man worth envy, be rather a terror to despots than subject to them; and be more acceptable in the sight of the gods for a little incense than are those who pour forth the blood of bulls to them. And I will give you, being pure, the gift of second sight, and so fill your eyes with rays of light that you shall discern a god, recognise a demi-god, and convict ghosts when they deceitfully assume human shape.

So he himself appears throughout his later years, having the calm serenity of the truly wise man—charming, charitable, lovable, witty, energetic, fearless of death, penetrating in discernment but merciful in condemnation, a very god among men both physically and intellectually, able to wield high powers of healing, divination, vision at a distance, and yet rejecting their use merely to make men marvel. His teaching was truly theosophical, as revealed not only in his general Pythagorean outlook, but also in his fundamental distinction between soul and body, his knowledge of the kinship of all being, his declaration that every

man held within himself the possibility of perfection. Always he held to the path of practical moderation and spiritual wisdom, attacking superstition, asserting no dogmas, acknowledging no differences of race or creed, and accepting all religions as righteous if the true spirit of understanding were present in them. To each, he held, his own appointed path; for all, followed rightly, led to a single salvation. He was a moral philosopher rigidly holding aloof from politics yet speaking fearlessly against the tyrannies of Nero and Domitian, and even on occasion, of Vespasian, who, like Titus and Nerva, was his friend.

Nowhere is the height of his austere wisdom more clearly revealed, perhaps, than in his attitude to prayer, which, with meditation, he performed regularly, yet as a self-exercise and communion rather than with any desire to secure divine intervention, for he held that not even the supreme Deity could wash away the stain of murder, and declared the noblest appeal to be one of simple acceptance: "Give me, ye Gods, what is my due." The essence of his teaching appears in the saying—from one of several treatises of which only fragments survive—that "the only fitting sacrifice to God is man's best reason, and not the word that comes from out his mouth".

Such is the man portrayed by Philostratus, and there are other witnesses, even among the Christian Fathers, to the wide esteem in which Apollonius was held long

after his death or passing. Statues and other monuments were erected to his memory in the third century, and controversy really commenced only a little later when Hierocles opposed the well-attested "miracles" of Apollonius to the Christian claim that the wonders worked by Jesus proved a unique divinity. Thenceforward orthodox criticism and derogation steadily increased; yet to the eighth, eleventh and even thirteenth centuries there is evidence of reverence or at least respect. Only in the sixteenth century and subsequently does one find the account of Philostratus attacked and dismissed as no more than a plagiarism of the life of Jesus—an idea which certainly never occurred even to the bitterest of earlier critics!

It has been charged against Apollonius as a mark of inferi-

ority that he left but few disciples, and no formal organisation, no church. Can those who have their church be called the happier? Is not every religious organisation, of human necessity, the Judas of its founder, that betrays as it kisses him? Better, surely, the solitary appeal to those able to respond. Better, surely, the simple unadorned personality of Apollonius than the distorted, incredible, hypocritical Jesus of the squabbling Christian Churches.

"Was Apollonius, then," asks G. R. S. Mead, "a trickster, a charlatan, a fanatic, a misguided enthusiast, or a philosopher, a reformer, a conscious worker, a true initiate, one of the earth's great ones? This each must decide for himself, according to his knowledge or his ignorance."

GEOFFREY WEST

Apollonius, a contemporary of Jesus of Nazareth, was, like him, an enthusiastic founder of a new spiritual school. Perhaps less metaphysical and more practical than Jesus, less tender and perfect in his nature, he nevertheless inculcated the same quintessence of spirituality, and the same high moral truths. His great mistake was to confine them too closely to the higher classes of society. While to the poor and the humble Jesus preached "Peace on earth and good will to men," Apollonius was the friend of kings, and moved with the aristocracy. He was born among the latter, and himself a man of wealth, while the "Son of man," representing the people, "had not where to lay his head;" nevertheless, the two "miracle-workers" exhibited striking similarity of purpose

Like Buddha and Jesus, Apollonius was the uncompromising enemy of all outward show of piety, all display of useless religious ceremonies and hypocrisy

If we study the question with a dispassionate mind, we will soon perceive that the ethics of Gautama-Buddha, Plato, Apollonius, Jesus, Ammonius Sakkas, and his disciples, were all based on the same mystic philosophy. That all worshipped one God, whether they considered Him as the "Father" of humanity, who lives in man as man lives in Him, or as the Incomprehensible Creative Principle; all led God-like lives.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *Isis Unveiled*, Vol. II, pp. 341-342

DREAMS OF FUTURE EVENTS

[R. L. Mégroz began his career as an office-boy in London, became a bank clerk, and rose to be assistant manager. Then the War broke out and he joined the army gathering experience in Gallipoli, Egypt, Sinai and France. A long list of publications is already to his credit—verse, biography, and literary studies being among the fields tilled.]

In this article Mr. Mégroz remarks upon the method of science which substitutes a new theory for an old one, without progressing; this was foreseen by H. P. Blavatsky who wrote in 1888 in *The Secret Doctrine* (I. 133-134):

"Science is welcome to speculate upon the physiological mechanism of living beings, and to continue her fruitless efforts in trying to resolve our feelings, our sensations, mental and spiritual, into functions of their inorganic vehicles. Nevertheless, all that will ever be accomplished in this direction has already been done, and Science will go no farther. She is before a dead wall, on the face of which she traces, as she imagines, great physiological and psychic discoveries, but every one of which will be shown later on to be no better than the cobwebs spun by her scientific fancies and illusions."

—EDS.]

In a previous article which received the hospitality of THE ARYAN PATH (March 1931), I attempted to trace the constant interest in dreams in the western world right back to the earliest historical records of ancient Egypt. The subject was too big to cover in more than a very discursive manner, but the principal outcome of the survey was that most people—great sages, powerful men of action, and "ordinary" individuals like ourselves—at all times were aware of something to wonder at in the common experience of dreaming. The motives which arouse a deep interest in dreams have always varied widely; there seems at first nothing in common between the terrors of a hermit Saint Antony and the concern of an ambitious Roman General or an Emperor as to the light thrown by his dream upon the result of a battle or a political manœuvre on

the morrow. But there is in both a conviction of something important to the self in the dream. It is a conviction which is entirely opposed to the sceptical attitude of a materialistic science relying upon new sets of terms like "nerves" and "hysteria," not to explain but to explain away inexplicable phenomena. Even the new-old science of psycho-analysis, which undoubtedly throws light upon the profoundest emotions that express themselves in dream-imagery, is emphatically repudiated as a sufficient explanation of certain kinds of dream-experiences.

The Editors of THE ARYAN PATH followed my last article with interesting quotations from an Appendix on Dreams in *Transactions of the Blavatsky Lodge*. Among them was a seven-fold classification of dreams, as Prophetic, Allegorical, Inspired by other minds, Restrospective, War-

ning (for others), Confused, Chaotic and Fanciful. This list, and the comments made on it, help one to think about a subject that is at present a morass of confused ideas. But like all attempts at scientific classification, it replaces things by names, and in doing so sets up purely intellectual distinctions which only very roughly correspond with reality.* The first group in that list, Prophetic Dreams, is the only one ascribed to the "Higher Self". The last one, "Dreams which are mere fancies and chaotic pictures" are said to be "owing to digestion, some mental trouble, or such-like external cause". But physical or emotional disturbance may accompany (and, it seems to me even induce) visions of the highest religious or artistic value (according to the character of the individual). The materialistic heresy, for instance, that mysticism was the product of a diseased mind or body, was based mainly upon biographical study of mystics and seers. I think, too, that a chaotic dream may often be a prophetic dream which cannot or at least is not, understood and interpreted. Here again we come to the importance of the quality of the individual mind. To take the simplest possible example, it is conceivable that two individuals might have a dream of similar value and intensity; for one of them it might become a vaguely remembered piece of nonsense to relate over the breakfast table, while the other

might derive a religious or an artistic inspiration from a contemplation of the dream. The most chaotic nightmare, following the most indigestible of suppers, is none the less mysterious in one aspect, for we know nothing about the substance of the dream objects or how they are created by the mind, notwithstanding all our theories about tangled emotions and physical stimuli. This is a statement which no scientific materialist would accept, so if we want to stress the metaphysical importance of dream experiences it is easier to abandon the many dreams which cannot be definitely removed from scientific "explanations" and to challenge those who regard dreams as mere hallucinations with a species which has defied scientific explanation.

This is the dream which reflects the future instead of the past. You can go right back to the ancient Egyptians or to the ancient Chaldees and you will find that a belief in the possibility of dreaming the future has been always an important element of divination. That mysterious pool of ancient wisdom which has undoubtedly fructified temporary religions and civilisations contains a knowledge of the self which is partly a knowledge of how to distinguish the nature of various dreams and to interpret them. And that knowledge (which must, I suppose, be called occult, though I dislike the implications of the word) has always confirmed the existence of a

* A careful study of the whole Transaction will reveal to our author that the table is more logical than he at present thinks.—EDS.

faculty in us for dreaming future events.

I find that over half a century ago H. P. Blavatsky was using this very argument of the unexplained prophetic dream against the scientific materialist, and pointing out that "if one single instance stubbornly refuses classification with 'strange co-incidences'—so much in favour with sceptics—then, prophetic, or verified dreams would demand an entire remodeling of physiology." *

While modern science continues to "progress" by upsetting the theories of earlier scientists about the nature of the universe and substituting new theories which will, by further progress, in turn be superseded, the study of the subject of dreams has also developed, but in a direction disconcerting to the sceptic. The publication two years ago of *An Experiment with Time* by J. W. Dunne was an inevitable development of the latest advances made in physics. But it proves to be scientific only in its methods of induction and deduction, for Mr. Dunne's thesis is too staggering to be acceptable to what is called science in the western world. It is nothing less than an assertion, supported by experiment and mathematical demonstration, that the faculty of knowing future events, and even of preventing them, is inherent in the human mind. In his prefatory Note to the second edition of *An Experiment with Time*, the author says:—

It has been rather surprising to discover how many persons there are who, while willing to concede that we habitually observe events before they occur, suppose that such prevision may be treated as a minor logical difficulty, to be met by some trifling readjustment in one or another of our sciences or by the addition of a dash of transcendentalism to our metaphysics. It may well be emphasized that no tinkering or doctoring of that kind could avail in the smallest degree. If prevision be a fact, it is a fact which destroys absolutely the entire basis of all our past opinions of the universe. Bear in mind, for example, that the foreseen event may be avoided.

The interested reader may go to *An Experiment with Time* to find the records of the author's own dream-anticipations of events. These dreams had better not be confused with prophetic visions, although the mental processes involved may ultimately be similar. A prophetic vision is the anticipatory dream charged with mystical wisdom; its imagery is full of symbolism referring to spiritual values; it is a picture of human existence from an unearthly angle or point of view. Translated into the terms of a homely story it is a parable. Instead of illustrating it from the visions of the great religious mystics, I suggest that the following account by the great dramatist Ibsen of a dream is a kind of vision with a prophetic quality in it, and that it is told as a parable:—

While wandering on a high mountain range with some friends, I like them became tired and despondent. We were suddenly surprised by night, and like Jacob we lay down to sleep, resting our heads on stones. My companions soon

went off to sleep, but I was not so successful. Finally I succumbed to weariness and in a dream an angel appeared before me, saying: "Arise, and follow me."

"Whither will you lead me in this darkness?" I asked, and received the reply: "Come, I will reveal to you human existence in its true reality."

Full of foreboding, I followed my guide and we descended a number of deep steps, and rocks towered above us like gigantic arches. Before us lay a great city of death with horrible remnants and tokens of mortality, and transient existence; an immense sunken world of corpses, death's silent subjects. Over all hovered a faded grandeur, a withered twilight enveloping church-walls, graves and sepulchres, and in a stronger light row upon row of white skeletons reflected a phosphorescent glow. A fear seized me as I stood by the angel's side. "Here, you see, all is vanity!" he said. Then arose a roar as of a coming storm, which grew to a raging hurricane, so that the dead moved and stretched their arms towards me, and with a cry I awoke wet from the cold dew of night.

When the psychologist reads this, he at once begins pointing out the personal sources of the imagery, the bleak, mountainous scenery and the weariness and unease of the despondent traveller who fell asleep in such an inhospitable place. But there remains in the vision the realisation, born out of the wisdom of the human race, of a spiritual truth that we can recognise by sharing the dreamer's unfamiliar point of view. When fear of death does not dominate the picture, the dreamer may, like Henry Vaughan, apprehend "the World of Light" that encircles us.

So some strange thoughts transcend our
wonted themes,
And into glory peep.

But the subject of prophetic visions is tremendous, and it does not offer the hard little pebble of an ascertained fact needed by the scientific and the commonsense mind as evidence. That is why physical science finds much more troublesome such a fact as that Swedenborg in Amsterdam should have suddenly exclaimed to the company about him that the royal palace in Christiania was on fire. It was, but how did he know? We must have terms for our theoretical explanations, so instead of questioning the commonsense view of space, we decided to call it telepathy. The less scientific called it clairvoyance. So, again, in face of instances of what the Scotch called "second-sight," a vision of a coming disaster, no one dared to question the commonsense view of time, and it seemed possible only to say "coincidence," or simply ignore the belief in "second-sight," as ignorant superstition. But it is carrying indifference too far to dismiss the records of all the ages like this, and they are all marked by similar beliefs.

Let us leave out the instances of anticipatory dreams of Roman Emperors and generals, and others who lived long enough ago for their dreams to have been the creations of legend, ignoring even the strangest confirmations by contemporary historians. Records of such dreams have continued in the modern world, right up to Mr. Dunne's experiments. Who does

* *The Theosophist*, Vol. III, p. 104.

not know of the well authenticated dream of President Lincoln a few days before his assassination? Broaching the subject very reluctantly to his wife, and refusing to admit that he believed in dreams, he described the latest dream that had so troubled his peace of mind. It was almost like a report of his own assassination and the scenes which followed it. Five years before this, in 1860, he had seen a double image of himself in the mirror. One image was healthy and lifelike, the other ghastly and like a wraith. Easy to dismiss this as a freak of imagination, born of unacknowledged fears, but then there are scores, probably hundreds of recorded cases of what were called "döppelgangers" in the eighteenth century. The idea, always held to be a superstition, that for a person to see the double of himself was a forewarning of death, grew up in the middle ages, and it was exploited in every conceivable way by novelists and poets of the "romantic terror" school between 1750 and 1850. Actually the döppelganger legend was in existence in the ancient world, and merely proved more attractive to the medieval mind. The instance of a person seeing another's double is that of Donne, the poet who became Dean of St. Paul's. It is well known, owing to Izaak Walton's biography. Donne had accompanied the English ambassador to Paris, leaving his wife who expected a child shortly. The day after his arrival he saw his wife pass across the room, her

hair hanging down, and a dead child in her arms. An urgent request for news was sent by a special messenger, who returned to tell Donne that his wife was ill but alive, and that at the time of his vision she had given birth to a dead child.

The Journal of the evangelist, Wesley, contains many records of unexplained forewarnings in dream and trance, which anybody may read. If a fiery evangelist may be considered unreliable on such a subject, what has a sceptic to say to the note by Samuel Taylor Coleridge in a letter to his friend Poole, in 1797? He recalled how his father, in September 1781, accompanied another son, Francis, to Plymouth, where the youth was to join a ship as midshipman. On his way back he arrived at Exeter early in the evening and was pressed to take a bed there for the night by some friends. He refused, and explained that he had been deeply impressed the night before by a dream of his death. He returned home, apparently in the best of health, and after a festive supper with his family went to bed. That night he died in bed.

A curious dream which resembles some of those described by Mr. Dunne, is the following one recorded by Frederick Greenwood in *Imagination in Dreams* (1894):—

One night I dreamt that, making a call on some matter of business I was shown into a fine great drawing room and asked to wait. Accordingly, I went over to the fire-place in the usual English

way, proposing to wait there. And there, after the same fashion, I lounged with my arm upon the mantelpiece; but only for a few moments. For feeling that my fingers had rested on something strangely cold, I looked, and saw that they lay on a dead hand; a woman's hand newly cut from the wrist.

Though I awoke in horror on the instant, this dream was quite forgotten—at any rate for the time—when I did next day make a call on some unimportant matter of business, was shown into a pretty little room adorned with various knick-knacks, and then was asked to wait. Glancing by chance toward the mantelpiece (the dream of the previous night still forgotten), what should I see upon it but the hand of a mummy, broken from the wrist. It was a very little hand, and on it was a ring that would have been a "gem ring" if the dull red stone in it had been genuinely precious. Wherefore I concluded that it was a woman's hand.

Coincidence. The dream certainly taught me nothing, and had no discernible purpose. Yet visions of severed hands on mantelpieces are not common, and, with or without previous dreaming of it, few men have actually seen one, even when taken from a mummy case, in that precise situation. Now had I myself rifled the tomb where she reposed from whom the relic was torn, or had I by any means acquired that poor little brown hand to make bric-a-brac of it, my dream would have been pertinent enough. Then

it would have made a pretty tale, with a moral that is not unneeded, perhaps. But, as it is, we can make nothing better of it than a dream gone astray.

Just so. Before Mr. Dunne set himself to systematise, with the scientist's own methods, what unexplained knowledge our more strange dreams may have to teach us, they were dismissed as freaks. It may be, it is indeed, certain, that a great deal of pertinent experience, of this kind, was never recorded during the sceptical nineteenth century just because nobody saw how it could be taken seriously. Before the nineteenth century, the lack of care in recording strange dreams of the future make them unauthentic as evidence for the scientific mind. It does not seem an exaggeration of the facts to say that with our modern scientific methods of recording experience and with the door opened to a realisation of the tremendous possibilities of more knowledge, the study of dreams must in the western world of to-day assume an importance equal to that of mathematics and astronomy. For in it lies a key to so much knowledge that we have forgotten.

R. L. MÉGROZ

THE IMPERSONAL GOD OF THE SUFIS

[**Mumtaz Armstrong**, Editor of *The Sufi Quarterly*, was introduced to our readers last October when he wrote on "The Jesuits". The Impersonal Deity taught by the Sufis, truly interpreted, is the Atman of the Vedantins. The position of the Theosophist-Occultist is made clear by H. P. Blavatsky (*Secret Doctrine* I, 8-9) thus :—

Space is neither a "limitless void," nor a "conditioned fulness," but both : being, on the plane of absolute abstraction, the ever-incognisable Deity, which is void only to finite minds, and on that of *mayavic* perception, the Plenum, the absolute Container of all that is, whether manifested or unmanifested : it is, therefore, that ABSOLUTE ALL. There is no difference between the Christian Apostle's "In Him we live and move and have our being," and the Hindu Rishi's "The Universe lives in, proceeds from, and will return to, Brahma (Brahmā) ;" for Brahma (neuter), the unmanifested, is that Universe in *abscondito*, and Brahmā, the manifested, is the Logos, made male-female in the symbolical orthodox dogmas. The God of the Apostle-Initiate and of the Rishi being both the Unseen and the Visible SPACE. Space is called in the esoteric symbolism "the Seven-Skinned Eternal Mother-Father." It is composed from its undifferentiated to its differentiated surface of seven layers.

"What is that which was, is, and will be, whether there is a Universe or not ; whether there be gods or none ?" asks the esoteric Senzar Catechism. And the answer made is—SPACE.—EDS.]

All men worship a Deity. To some He is an ambition, to some a fellow-human, to some the lusts of the flesh ; a few—very few—offer their devotion to the old grey-beard of the stained-glass window.

It is important to distinguish between the reality and the profession. Not many of us admit—at least, in public—the existence of a graven image in our hearts. We profess to bow down before some nebulously-defined Divinity set up for us on the pedestal of our national religion. In the Church of England, for instance, we are guided by the Thirty-nine Articles to a God "without body, without passions, and without parts". As a matter of fact, our minds are early impressed by the Old Testament Scriptures which

are so often read, and not by the Thirty-nine Articles which we never see. Now, the Old Testament God has body, parts, and passions—and very little else. In the end, influenced by an hereditary inclination to religious fear, we incline before the tribal deity, and not to the broader but vague conceptions of theology. So it is, always—the superstitious up-bringing of ignorant educators infects childhood, swamping our chances of a later influx of ideas.

To all practical intents and purposes, however, the modern man or woman is not really affected by ideas about God. Enlightened by common-sense and some scant reading, he or she rejects the current notions of religion, and says with Burton :—

There is no God, no man-made God ;
A bigger, stronger, crueller man ;
Black phantom of our baby-fears,
Ere Thought, the life of Life, began.

Further studies in theological history only bring about a final decision. In the words of Henri Beyle :—"La seule excuse pour Dieu est—qu'il n'existe pas."

Here, then, is the average man without a real God, adrift on the sands of Time : a solitary individual, only held, if held at all, by occasional mental reference to a scientific but undefined "First Cause".

Increasing numbers to-day, in every land, are dissatisfied with an inevitable feeling in themselves of non-completion and instability. Rightly, they turn again to examine this question of a God. Again the theologians fail them—no country but offers propaganda of an aggressive kind, monopolising the Creator : no priest but encourages devotees, like the ostrich, to bury their heads in his sand.

"Be ye Good Boys, go seek for Heaven,
"Come pay the priest that holds the key!"
So spake, and speaks, and aye shall speak
The last to enter Heaven,—he.
Are these the words for men to hear ?
Yet such the Church's general tongue,
The horseleech-cry so strong, so high,
Her heavenward Psalms and Hymns among.

What now ? The seeker is left with two possible means of consolation—Science and Mysticism. Fortunately, in this twentieth century, he may find a guide who is mystic and scientist in one. Both science and mysticism deal in realities, so far as our three-dimensional faculties are able to apprehend them ; both abjure hypocrisy, humbug, and self-deception. It is for this reason that

men like Jeans and Eddington incline more and more to the theses of the mystic schools. Among the latter, with very practical teaching for the seeker, is the Sufi School. Sir Richard Burton, whom we have already quoted, criticizes—in the light of his Sufism—those orthodox bodies that have proved a stumbling-block :—

"You all are right, you all are wrong,"
We hear the careless Sufi say,
"For each believes his glimmering lamp
"To be the gorgeous light of day.
"Thy faith why false, my faith why true ?
" 'Tis all the work of Thine and Mine,
"The fond and foolish love of self
"That makes the Mine excel the Thine."
Cease then to mumble rotten bones,
And strive to clothe with flesh and blood
The skeleton ; and to shape a Form
That all shall hail as fair and good.

A paradox leads to the shaping of the "Form"—it must be as form-less as our human minds can make it. The Sufi starts from the other end in conceiving his idea of God. He tries, so far as imagination will allow, to put himself in God's place. He tries to be "universal" in describing that cosmos of which he is but an insignificant part. All the fallacies of theology spring from the disastrous policy of starting from the human end. Here am I, a man ! How should God be ? Like *me*, of course : the king of creation—only better and greater. Alas ! "better" and "greater" are *relative* words and lead to no inspiration beyond that of very human egotism, propelled by material desires. It is hard indeed to break away into Infinity from such limitations. They encourage the kind of loose thinking which stamps Mr. J. C.

Powys' much-discussed monument to Pessimism: *In Defence of Sensuality*.

Surely, it is not inconceivable that the First Cause might, by using Its free-will, have managed to reduce the pain of the world to a kind of minimum—just enough of it to break up the paradisiac monotony!—instead of allowing the balance on the good side to be no greater than it is? Why could not the First Cause almost overcome, if not quite overcome, the evil in Its own nature?

Mr. Powys goes on, of course, to indulge and elaborate the notion that the Deity is helpless and that Accident plays a major part in His design. That all comes from the fact that Deity is being examined through a pair of spectacles of Mr. Powys' own making, and which are coloured by the drab tints of his own apparently accidental and helpless life.

Nothing could be less like the attitude of the Sufi. For more than a thousand years, Sufi mystics have condemned categorically all such ideas of a personal god, extra-cosmic creator of the universe. Those who hold them, have barred the way to Progress with an imaginary but dangerous gate, whose phantom height grows in ratio to the time we spend behind it. Draw a line round a goose in the farm-yard and nothing can make it step beyond. It feels it cannot, and therefore it cannot. But the line is no barrier to ward off an attack. The man-made conception of God is no "present help in time of trouble". It brings no possibility of advance in God-knowledge, with a consequent advance in power.

Imagine what may be *real* of God, and enlarge your imagining as He becomes more real. Go on doing that, guided by Nature, meditation, and esoteric practice—into infinity. Such are the Sufi precepts.

What can we imagine, that may be safely called *real*, about the Infinite One? A God, Who is worthy of the name, say the Sufis, must be boundless, omniscient, almighty. His only scripture is the book of Nature: His distinguishing feature, Harmony. There is nothing here unscientific, but we must carry our imaginings to their logical conclusion. "Boundless" suggests no limitation to anthropomorphic forms—it suggests what God is, in fact: Spirit or Essence. The Divine One of the Sufi pantheists is in all, is all. How then can He be a "man," a Being apart? The poorest reason confirms, rather, that man is in God, is part of God. So with everything and creature that is made. "Omniscient" hardly connotes "Accident," or limitation to human views in Time and Space. "Almighty" forbids the possibility of "evil" in our sense of the word—to the Sufi, Pope's maxim holds good:—"Whatever is, is Right," our blindness notwithstanding. Nature may well be unintelligible in some aspects—to us; but it is not chaos—that we can see. The more we examine it, the more we can at least prove its orderly, unaccidental progress; and the more the capacity for seeing Beauty grows. Anything further comes with

time. At least a right start has been made, towards a God we may expect to grow nearer to, and Who will be ours to lose this timorous self in, in the day of trouble. To lose the *self*, to lose its limitation in Divine perfection—that is the ultimate secret of true religion. How shall we do it if God is separate, barred away by strange attributes and the vast gulfs of Space and Time?

Listen to the Sufi poet, 'Umar Khayyám':—

The idol said to the idolater, "O my servant,
Knowest thou for what reason thou hast
become mine adorer?
On me hath shone in his beauty that *one*
Who looketh forth from thee, O my
beholder!"

A long array of Sufi poets and mystics—in Persia, Arabia, India—has pleaded thus, century after century, for rational thinking on the path to God. No Eastern thinker but has been influenced by Rumi, Attar, Hafiz, Jami, Al Ghazzali, and their like. These latter would not admit for a moment that there could be reality in our separate personalities. To them their Omnipresent (and therefore "Impersonal") God was really "Omnipresent" and therefore really "all in all". The conception of actual separation never poisoned their minds at the outset.

And so, prepared by mental conceptions and religious inspiration, the Sufis have made, they say, headway in the godly life.

Ah!—but have they? Across our modern brains there clangs again an echo from the *Kasidah*:—

How shall the Shown pretend to ken
Aught of the Showman or the Show?
Why meanly bargain to believe,
Which only means thou ne'er canst know?

The Sufi mystics teach, that we can transcend our limited state by virtue of that very Spirit within us which is seeking through us to experience life. For every step our understanding takes in the right direction, the Great Understanding within takes ten steps to meet us. We can refuse to remain cognisant only of the world of names and forms and of our selves. We can worship a real God. We can progress in knowledge of Him or It until we lose our fears and fancies in Compassion Absolute. The Sufi saints and Masters have proved it in their lives, and left a bulk of testimony. It is not irrational to follow in their footsteps, to try for ourselves. The only real proof of the true God is to be had, not from words but our own experience. For the only real life is the inner life.

It should never be forgotten that the Sufis owe their spiritual success to their worship of an Impersonal God, One who—because He knows nothing of nationality, jealousy, hatred, forms or names, and is in us and with us, loving and inspiring, whether we like it or not—will raise us up some day from the tomb of self.

MUMTAZ ARMSTRONG

WHERE IDEAL OF GOVERNMENT WAS REALIZED

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This article has a message for the India of to-day—both for the ruling class and the subject people. Also, perused in the light of the two review-articles immediately following, it brings a message for all struggling politicians and idealistic reformers.—EDS.]

I

With all its shortcomings, the feudal government of Japan under the Tokugawa Shoguns was undoubtedly one of the best the world has ever seen. Though it shut the doors of this country to the outside world and on that account checked the expansion of the Japanese race overseas, it managed to keep the country free from foreign complications and to maintain profound peace at home for nearly three centuries. In fact the whole country was so well governed that Japan was a Utopia in reality, and the people in general led a carefree and contented life. They did not know social unrest, class strife, unemployment, crime waves, menace of foreign wars, and though they had no voice in the government they were satisfied that life and property were well protected. The central government had its seat at Yedo (present Tokyo) and exercised supervision over the administration of the country carried on by some three hundred Daimyos, each of whom was the ruler of a fief assigned to him. These territorial barons had practically absolute power, but despots or tyrants

were rare. On a few occasions the central government at Yedo dispossessed Daimyos of their fiefs for abuse of power. This no doubt served as a warning to the Daimyos in general and caused them to restrain themselves and encouraged them to give the people placed under their care a benevolent and paternal rule.

But there was another powerful cause which made many of them very good rulers. It was the Confucian doctrine which taught that a ruler owed it to Heaven to consider himself an agent of gods and as such to make himself an example, in the observance of virtues to the people under his care and to look after their welfare with disinterested attention, sacrificing everything for their sake, if necessary, life itself. Tokugawa Iyeyasu, founder of the Shogunate Government, and some of the successive Shoguns were great patrons of Confucianism and encouraged its study among the ruling classes, the Daimyos and Samurais. In consequence, the rulers of feudal Japan were generally men deeply imbued with the sense of *noblesse oblige* and rarely departed therefrom

in the discharge of their duties. On the other hand, the people at large were docile and law-abiding. In these circumstances, the relation between the ruler and the ruled was generally very intimate, the former regarding the latter as protégés and the latter looking up to the former for wisdom and guidance. In fact, in not a few places the ideal of government was realized during the feudal age. A typical instance was witnessed in the fief of Shonai in Northern Japan in the middle of last century.

II

This fief consisted of two districts with a population of 200,000 in the province of Uzen. Though generally mountainous, the two districts contained some extensive and fertile fields yielding a rich crop of rice year after year. Sakai was the family name of its hereditary Daimyo. His revenue was nominally 138,000 *koku* of rice a year, but as his fief was a very rich estate, in reality it was much greater.

Shonai was originally a rather poor estate. That it had become so well off was chiefly due to the wise administration of its successive rulers. Themselves leading a life of thrift and industry, they encouraged it among the farmers under their care, extended helping hands to those in needy circumstance, reclaimed waste lands, opened means of irrigation, lightened taxes and otherwise endeavoured to enrich them and improve their conditions. Sakai

Tadanori, who was the ninth in the genealogy of his House, was particularly a wise ruler. It was his ambition to have no pauper in the region he governed and make it a land where none was too rich nor too poor. He was several times offered the position of Cabinet Minister in the central government at Yedo, but steadfastly declined to accept the proffered honour believing that his duty and mission lay in the domain under his care.

It need not be said that the grateful people of Shonai regarded their ruler with highest reverence and deepest affection. Generation after generation they had lived and prospered under the benign rule of the successive heads of the same noble family, and so a peculiar relation very different from one usually existing between ruler and ruled had sprung up between them. It was a relation similar to that existing between father and children. It had no element of bitterness, fear or antagonism.

This happiness, however, was suddenly and rudely shaken at its foundation in the latter part of 1840. Sakai Tadanori, the wise and benevolent ruler, had died some years before and been succeeded by his son. The latter was also a good man and continuing his father's policy, was as much revered and loved by his people as was his predecessor. For certain reason, he was not on good terms with Mizuno, a powerful Minister of the central government at Yedo. Mizuno was an

ambitious man. In order to curry favour with the Shogun and strengthen his influence, he concocted an intrigue to deprive Sakai of the fief of Shonai and give that rich estate to a favourite of the Shogun. With Machiavellian skill, he prevailed on his colleagues in the cabinet to support his plan and on November 1, 1840, issued in the name of the Shogun an order to Sakai transferring him from Shonai to Nagaoka in the province of Echigo.

The news that their beloved lord had been served an order of transference spread like wild fire among the people of Shonai and cast gloom over the whole region. There arose among them low murmurings, which gradually grew into voices of protest and indignation. In every village, men of any importance held assemblies to discuss ways and means for having the hateful order rescinded. In due time these assemblies developed into a great assembly of representatives from all the villages of Shonai. It was a remarkable meeting. Unlettered and rude-mannered as these representatives were, they were men of sterling character, simple, honest and earnest, and were all firmly resolved to attain their object, without much talk, they unanimously resolved, first, to pray to gods to help them, secondly, to petition to the government at Yedo to withdraw the order, thirdly, to ask for help from Daimyos of the neighbouring provinces, fourthly, to prevent if necessary even by force, the

departure of Sakai for the place to which he was transferred, and fifthly, in case of failure of these measures to carry out a desperate measure.

The representatives returned to their respective villages to announce the decisions they had arrived at. Forthwith the villagers, one and all, old and young, men, women and children made it a rule to visit and pray at village shrines day by day. Many took up fasting and not a few went on a long and hard pilgrimage to great shrines in distant places.

In the meantime a number of brave men made preparations to go up to Yedo and present petitions to the advisers of the Shogun, and if necessary to the Shogun himself. This was a daring venture, for in those days a direct appeal to high dignitaries was strictly forbidden under severe penalties. Particularly a direct appeal to the Shogun was regarded as a heinous crime, any man attempting it being punished with death by crucifixion. The men knew it well, but were ready to risk their lives. Nevertheless, it was no easy matter for them to start on a journey to Yedo, for the reason that lest their activities might be interpreted by the authorities at Yedo as a sign of disloyalty on his part, Lord Sakai was compelled to prevent them from carrying out their plans. He fully appreciated their motive, but had no other way than forbidding them to proceed to Yedo. Accordingly he caused all exits from Shonai to be strictly guarded.

The men, however, were not daunted. One after another they left for Yedo in secret. In the course of a few months as many as five parties of men, 77 in all, travelled to Yedo and by waylaying Ministers of the Shogun on their way to their offices presented to them petitions written in tears and blood. They also presented similar petitions to the Daimyos of the adjacent provinces asking for help. One of these petitions, which has been preserved, ran substantially as follows:—

We, representatives of the peasants of Shonai, most respectfully ask your Lordship to take cognizance of the grief into which we have been plunged by the order issued last year by the high authorities for the transference of our revered Lord Sakai. It was 220 years ago that the ancestor of our Lord came to Shonai. It was then a swampy region, yielding but a poor crop. He and his successors opened ways of drainage, reclaimed many tracts of waste land and converted the whole place into a prosperous plain. It was entirely due to their service that our forefathers and their descendants lived in peace and without want. Especially grateful are we to our present Lord, for the year before last when a severe famine visited us and we experienced great difficulty of living, his Lordship spared no pain to give relief to us. Not only did he distribute among us free rice, but gave us even salted salmon and herrings, so that we might not lack nourishing food. To those in neediest circumstances, his Lordship gave not only food but clothing. It is difficult for us to describe how deeply grateful we feel for his great favours. We have been hoping to repay even a hundredth part of his benevolence by working hard, by saving as much as we can and by paying taxes in arrears. To have to lose such a good Lord is a disaster too great for us to bear. We feel like a lonely traveller

deprived of light in a dark night or a helpless baby separated from its mother. We have been praying to gods to help us in this great hour of trial. Our appeals to the high authorities at Yedo, which we presented six times through our representatives who went there in spite of our Lord's injunction and at the risk of their lives have not been answered. We are in despair. Thousands of peasants have lately been assembling at different centres, none knowing what to do, but all resolved to die if they are not allowed to retain their beloved Lord among them. We most respectfully ask your Lordship to help us.

Such sincere appeals cannot but move even the most hard-hearted of men. It is not surprising that opinion began to grow among influential Daimyos disapproving the action of Lord Mizuno. Among others, Lord Date, the powerful Daimyo of Sendai, adjoining the fief of Shonai, sent a report to the Cabinet at Yedo concerning the commotion prevailing among the peasants in Shonai. In this report, after describing the serious situation Lord Date said: "I hear that it is through no fault of his that Lord Sakai has been ordered to move out of Shonai and that there is no special reason justifying the measure."

Anxious and weary days passed, but no information came from Yedo to the peasants whether their petitions were granted or not.

Meanwhile, their representatives at Yedo continued their movement with redoubled energy and were steadily gaining sympathizers in influential quarters. The ministers of the Shogun were profoundly impressed and on July 12th 1841, an order was issued saying that ac-

cording to the desire of the Shogun Lord Sakai should remain at his post in Shonai. For fear of lowering its prestige, the Government had never revoked what it once decreed. So this was an unprecedented concession and great was the astonishment with which the people at large received it. They, however, soon learned why the Government had admitted and rectified its mistake. They were delighted and instead of going down the popularity of the authorities, went up.

It was on July 16 the news reached the peasants of Shonai by an express messenger. It was received with a tremendous outburst of joy. Many wept with joy. Too excited some could hardly walk straight and a few, running like madmen, fell into streams. Throughout the two districts of Shonai a grand festival was held, every house hanging out lanterns.

Thus the remarkable movement of the peasants of Shonai ended in their victory. Nobody claimed credit for it or sought rewards. None was the hero thereof, but all were the winners of the laurel and had no other compensation than feeling thankful. As soon as the merry-making was over, all returned to their normal course of life, to till the land, to reap the fruit of their labour and to live in peace and contentment.

III

What is the ideal of government? According to Aristotle, a

good government is one in which as much as possible is left to the laws, and as little as possible to the will of the governor. We find that all the governments in the West are founded upon this principle. In the East, however, a good government was considered to be one which had as few laws as possible and which was under the direction of a wise and virtuous man. In fact it was the dream of Eastern philosophers that a law consisting of only three articles should suffice for the government of any country.

In Old Japan, this idea of government prevailed. Our forefathers had but few laws for the administration of the country, so that, before Japan opened her doors to foreign intercourse and adopted foreign institution, the two things, which were conspicuous by their absence, were, according to a British Minister, who came to this country early in the Meiji era, lawyers and bed-bugs. Japan now possesses both of them in abundance, particularly the former, and we seem to be not much happier than our forefathers were. Indeed, it sometimes seems to us that Japan committed a great mistake by accepting the European method. Old Japan was a country governed not by law, but by morality, not by lawyers and politicians, but by gentlemen—nobles, samurais and scholars. Of course there were sometimes bad rulers, but on the whole rulers of Old Japan were men of high character. They considered themselves as trustees of the people's

welfare, and bound, not by laws and regulations, but by the sense of moral responsibility, discharged their duties honestly and faithfully. This explains why Old Japan was so well governed and for nearly three centuries peace reigned throughout the country under the autocratic government of the Tokugawa Shoguns.

Plato's ideal of government was to place the reins of administration in the hands of a ruling class, who would do their duty with the consciousness that they are serving their country. It cannot be said that feudal lords of Old Japan were such a class of disinterested rulers, but it cannot be gainsaid that they were generally men better qualified than anybody else to come up to Plato's ideal of a governor. Typical of them were Sakais of Shonai. They proved themselves such good rulers that the people governed by them wanted them and risked their all when they were in danger of losing them. It certainly can be said that they realized to a great

extent the ideal of government.

We have been told that the ideal of government is democracy. Undoubtedly it is so. But I for one prefer such an autocracy as that of Sakai to a democracy as is now practised in certain Western countries. In those countries, the so-called democracy is a rule of the majority represented by a few capable and not infrequently unprincipled men, and the minority, the class of educated and cultured men, is suffering and degenerating in consequence. It is despotism of the proletariat, and signs are many that it is as bad as, if not worse than autocracy.

A true democracy can never exist until altruism has really become the animating impulse of every individual. In other words, unless all people are imbued with the spirit of Gotama, of Confucius, of Jesus and each loves his neighbour as brother and is ready to sacrifice for the happiness of others, "the world safe for democracy" will not appear.

ISOH YAMAGATA

The individual cannot separate himself from the race, nor the race from the individual. The law of Karma applies equally to all, although all are not equally developed. In helping on the development of others, the Theosophist believes that he is not only helping them to fulfil their Karma, but that he is also, in the strictest sense, fulfilling his own. It is the development of humanity, of which both he and they are integral parts, that he has always in view, and he knows that any failure on his part to respond to the highest within him retards not only himself but all, in their progressive march. By his actions, he can make it either more difficult or more easy for humanity to attain the next higher plane of being.

—H. P. BLAVATSKY, *The Key to Theosophy*, pp. 198-9

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

CHANGING THE MIND OF THE RACE

[In increasing measure the effort is being made to bring the light of philosophy to the aid of political and social reformers. Two recent volumes examined below by two eminent critics uncover some important ideas which need further elucidation and enlightenment. We bracket them because the reviewers deal with a common problem, on which sidelight is thrown in the preceding article by our able Japanese contributor.—EDS.]

I

PLATO'S MESSAGE FOR THE MODERNS *

[D. L. Murray was introduced to our readers over a year ago when he wrote in these pages on "Is a New Religion Emerging?" An author and a journalist of high standing, guided by definite ideals, his suggestion in the following review deserves careful consideration by all political and social reformers.—EDS.]

Mr. Lowes Dickinson's new introduction to the philosophy of Plato, based on broadcast talks and primarily intended for those who do not know Greek, gives a fresh illustration of his remarkable gift for simple exposition. This little book is intelligible to the least instructed reader and could (we imagine) be read by the deepest Platonic scholar without any sense of "being talked down to". It is no mean feat; and Mr. Dickinson's success, we take to be due to two things, the sincerity of his thought and the beauty of his style. These are qualities that enable him to appeal at once to the plain man and the scholar, and both of them might go far before they found such an admirable account of Plato's background in the Greece of his time, or such a speaking portrait of Socrates, that gnarled and humorous old

cross-examiner, who provoked the Athenians like a gadfly till they put him to death, and who was made by his disciple Plato the mouthpiece of his own profound opinions in the dialogues that Mr. Dickinson so brilliantly summarizes.

We wish to make plain at the outset our sense of the great value of this little work, because we cannot bring ourselves to agree wholly with Mr. Dickinson's estimate of the place that Plato holds, or should hold, in modern life. It is evident from the structure of Mr. Dickinson's book that he considers Plato's social and political doctrines (in the widest sense) as the part of his doctrine from which the world of to-day has most to learn, and thus the bulk of his exposition is devoted to the two great political dialogues, the *Republic* and the *Laws*.

The whole world is rocking under our feet, as was the world of Greece when Plato flourished. I speak here not only, nor chiefly, of political shocks, but of what underlies them, the overturn of ideas. Everything is now being questioned, right and wrong, religion, philosophy, marriage, property, government. So was it also in the Greece of Plato, and that is how and why he came to write as he did. There is no topic of importance which we discuss that he did not discuss too; and that, with an intelligence more profound and elevated than has often been brought to bear on such issues.

Does Mr. Dickinson here allow sufficiently for the differences between the civilisation in which Plato lived and our own? The city-states of Greece for which he legislated were little more than big parishes by our standard: 300 men made a formidable army, and the most urgent political and military despatches had to be carried by a man running. There were no communications save by horse or sail; no printing, no industrial machinery, no labour problem, since a slave population without rights provided for all needs. Plato could know little of geography, less of history, nothing almost that was not wrong of physics, biology or the rest of the natural sciences. To apply his ideas of government, property, marriage, eugenics to a world in size, composition and outlook so utterly different from his as our own, is not indeed necessarily fruitless, but a task demanding great circumspection. One factor in politics is no doubt constant, human psychology: and the sketches that Plato makes of the

types of "democratic" "plutocratic" and "aristocratic" statesmen are as true (and even amusing) to-day as in his own time, so is his gorgeous caricature of the sophisms of "free education". But it is not really possible, we think, to learn how to solve the problems of great modern nation-states or empires from the prescriptions Plato wrote for the ailments of small city communities, living by the plough, the sailing-ship and the spear. Where, then, lies the value of Plato as a study for the modern world? Precisely, we think, in his capacity to dive beneath the "topical" and variable elements in man and his condition to the permanent spiritual needs of the soul. It is when he is speaking, not to the ancient or the modern, not to the Greek or the barbarian, not to the agricultural or the mechanized man, but to the permanent man that his message remains of eternal validity. It is less Plato the sociologist or moralist than Plato the religious seer that our day may return to for refreshment and revelation. Says an Oxford Professor:—

Platonism is the mood of one who has a curious eye for the endless variety of this visible and temporal world, and a fine sense of its beauties, yet is haunted by the presence of an invisible and eternal world behind, or, when the mood is most pressing, within the visible and temporal world, and sustaining both it and himself—a world not perceived as external to himself, but inwardly lived by him, as that with which in moments of ecstasy, or even habitually, he is become one.

* *Plato and his Dialogues* by G. Lowes Dickinson (George Allen & Unwin, London. 6s.)

We may not find it possible to accept, we may even be candid enough to say that we find it very hard as much as to comprehend Plato's peculiar doctrine that behind the show of visible things there stands the world of eternal ideas or forms of which the shapes we see and touch are but shadows or imperfect copies, the mystical realm in which the perfect Sea, City, Horse, Dog, Man, and the Absolute Good subsist uncontaminated by change. But it is the burden of all religious faiths that the life of man in all its vicissitudes is the working towards a spiritual ideal, the participation in a mysterious reality that we can only express by symbol and myth (such symbols and myths as Plato himself devised with supreme poetical grandeur again and again in his philosophical dialogues); and nowhere shall we find the existence of

this underlying reality more persuasively and potently affirmed than in the works of Plato. After all, that reconciliation of warring Churches and creeds which is so diligently sought nowadays is most likely to be found by the recognition that each expresses in a pictorial language of its own a mysterious reality that is common to all. Plato's famous fable of the cave, in which sit fettered men judging of what passes by in the daylight outside by the reflections on the wall within which are all that they can see, is a parable of the religious knowledge of men. It is a pity that they should wrangle over these shadows instead of joining in worship of the substance, the indefinable but not wholly hidden Divine. To promote a universal agreement in religion is one of the aims of Theosophy; it finds support in the philosophy of Plato.

D. L. MURRAY

II

AN IMPRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY*

[J. D. Beresford finds the new book of H. G. Wells interesting, even instructive, but incapable of inspiring the average reader to change the mode of his life.

The book does not offer a stone when bread is asked; it is bread but people are unable to swallow, because they are travelling in an arid desert, are thirsty and clamour for water. Mr. Wells fails in persuading them to eat that bread with their eyes fixed on a distant oasis, which is recognized as a mirage.

If Mr. Wells would use the key of recurring cycles in history, and would impartially examine the propositions of Asiatic Psychology, he would not only find a clue as to how the return of cultures takes place through the reincarnation of those who build civilizations, ever on a rising altitude, but also the purpose and *modus operandi* of evolution.—EDS.]

* *The Work, Health and Happiness of Mankind* by H. G. Wells. (Heinemann, London. 10s. 6d. net.)

Mr. Wells's attitude to humanity is that of an anxious father, who having decided precisely the sort of sons he desires and what they shall do when they grow up, sets before them his own knowledge of life and with it his plan, conscientiously and elaborately conceived, for their development and future. Naturally he meets with opposition, but with a deliberate patience, only occasionally giving way to spasms of irritability he continues to expound and re-expound his scheme for the perfection he sees so clearly ahead of them, if they will but follow his advice. Sometimes he draws for these children of his, highly detailed and coloured pictures of the new golden age in being. At others he argues clearly and very convincingly his reasons for condemning their present way of life and for substituting the world of his desires. Or again, as in *The Outline of History*, *The Science of Life*, and now in the completion of that Trilogy with *The Work, Health and Happiness of Mankind*, he traces every stage in their growth and development, shows them where in the past they have fallen into error, praises them for their present achievements, and finally demonstrates that their evolution having followed the lines he has traced, they must ultimately become that which he has already foreseen, so why will they not accept his prescription and thus hasten the coming of the New Era of satisfaction and content.

In these addresses to humanity

at large, Mr. Wells, although he exhibits now and again, as he must, the detachment of the historian or the scientist in his general view of our evolution and development, does not stand superciliously apart from his kind in the manner of his great contemporary, Bernard Shaw. It is not Wells's method, despite his biological training, to dissect and exhibit his specimens so that we may wonder at his technical ability and be startled by our recognition of the vividness with which these displayed subjects depict the living type. He is too sympathetic, too generous, too paternal to do no more than caricature our weaknesses, and leave us with a faint sneer of contempt because we are such awkward, ugly, unintelligent creatures. Also, his optimism has that ideal quality which can never admit defeat. At the age of 65, he comes again to his review of the world and his plans for its future, with a zest, a clear sightedness and, perhaps most remarkably an ability for dramatic and vivid literary expression, that shows no mark of decline. So far from being disheartened by the reluctance of mankind to put his gospel into practice, he is, apparently, more hopeful now than he has ever been.

The work now under review follows the same plan as that of the two volumes that preceded it in the series, but the subject of this final instalment is in a sense a summary of the whole enquiry. Here, following still the synoptical

method whenever practicable, Mr. Wells has treated the inception and progress of a host of human activities. He shows us how man first became an "economic animal" by the accretion of property, beginning with such portable possessions as a skin or a flint tool, and ending with flocks and tillable land that presently necessitated the organising of the community and then in some dim, unrecorded epoch to the founding of the city, and the principle of exchange and barter. He has indicated the genesis of logical thought, the forsaking of the child-process of thinking in pictures under the direction of fantasy for the constructive reasoning of the philosopher and the scientist. He has given us some kind of conspectus of economic developments of the coming of machinery, of the growth and present condition of trade. There are chapters on sociology, the position of women, government, the distribution of population, education, war, in short, with one exception, on all the diverse activities, interactions and energies that we recognise as elements in the political, economic and social world of the present day. And all of them are treated with the same insight, and the same brilliant gift for logical thought and exposition.

We may, indeed, very well pause at this point, to ponder the exceedingly interesting problem of why the world at large should be so obtuse as not to follow Mr. Wells's counsel, at least to the

extent of enthusiastically supporting his creed and policy? It is easy to account for the refusal of the wealthy—they have too much to lose. But the wealthy are, numerically, a negligible fraction of the world's population. What of the others, the great mass of the people educated, half-educated and illiterate? They must surely recognise that the way of Mr. Wells is the way of common sense towards those cities of content to be built by the good-will of mankind on the ground of common interest and mutual understanding? Two million copies of *The Outline of History* have been sold in various editions and languages; and it is still selling. Is not this an indication that the thought of the world is turning however turgidly into the course that Mr. Wells has so strenuously and persistently shaped? If not, can we find any reason for his relative failure? Is it possible, for instance, that he has made some extraordinary error in his deduction from those facts which so far as human knowledge can be sure of anything, are the accepted data of the educated man? Or has he omitted some vital factor, some necessary constant in his immense equation? Yet he claims that these three works represent "*all current human activities and motives—all and nothing less*".

Now, if all the statements Mr. Wells has ever made, surely this that we have just quoted, is the most astounding, for in the work under review there is only the

most casual reference to religion. It is true that in *The Outline of History* the influence of religion—were it only as a fruitful cause for dissension, or wars, or as a stumbling-block in the path of science,—could not be so slightly dismissed; but even there it was treated not as a great energising motive but rather as a passing phase of ignorant superstition. Yet out of the world's estimated population of nineteen hundred million people, how many are there who do not profess religion of some sort or another? And can we regard the influence of say, Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity and Moslemism as a negligible influence on the world's thought and action at the present day, and one that will ultimately fade in the light of the new age of reason.

These are questions that make one demand in sheer bewilderment if Mr. Wells's early training has blinded him to this aspect of human development. He writes:—

We contemporary human beings, are taught so much from our earliest years . . . that a multitude of ideas seem to us to be in the very nature of things, whereas it is merely that at a very early stage they have been built into the fabric of our minds.

Can we infer then, from his own statement that his reaction from orthodoxy, his work at the College of Science and his subsequent development have so far ousted the idea of religion from his mind that it seems to him to be outside "the very nature of things"? Before attempting to answer that question, however, let

us quote a later passage from the work before us, in which Mr. Wells writes:—

It is impossible to dismiss mystery from life. Being is altogether mysterious. Mystery is all about us and in us, the Inconceivable permeates us, it is "closer than breathing, nearer than hands and feet". For all we know, that which we are may rise at death from living, as an intent player wakes up from his absorption when a game comes to an end, or as a spectator turns his eyes from the stage as the curtain falls, to look at the auditorium he has for a long time forgotten. These are pretty metaphors, that have nothing to do with the game or the drama of space and time. Ultimately the mystery may be the only thing that matters, but *within the rules and limits of the game of life*, when you are catching trains or paying bills or earning a living, the mystery does not matter at all.

It is evident, therefore, that Mr. Wells is not blind in this particular connection, but only, and so strangely, for him, illogical. He postulates that ultimately this mystery may be the only thing that matters, but decides that in the common affairs of life it plays no part. And having made that decision he looks the other way whenever religion is likely to obtrude itself on his notice, and says "No, in this book we are dealing with practical things on the surface of the earth. . . . We deal with the daily life of human beings now and in the ages immediately ahead. We remain in the space and time of ordinary experience . . . at an infinite distance from ultimate truth".

It is no longer necessary, therefore, to ponder that problem of

why the world at large does not accept Mr. Wells's prescriptions with a greater enthusiasm. His forecasts may be true, his judgments of present conditions inopugnable but what has he to offer that man of his instance, who is catching trains, paying bills and earning a living? The prospect of a happier future that he will never see. The credit of having done something to make the world better for a new race that he will never know. But however magnificent in its self-effacing altruism may be this modern version of Positivism, it is not a bait to entice the average man and woman. They may well answer him as he has answered those who assert that his "mystery" is the reality and his facts but passing aspects of illusion, by saying, "We also, are dealing with the practical things on the surface of the earth, and have neither time nor inclination to consider the distant future".

And, strangely enough, it is to those who believe in the "mystery" as the essential stimulus of life and action, to whom this vision of a building for the ages to come, will make the true appeal. If a man had no religion, —though indeed all men above the very lowest grade of primitive intelligence have some intimation of the eternal principle within them—he would have no incentive to work for the good of anyone but himself. On the other hand, as he develops in self-knowledge and consciousness, becoming increasingly more aware of himself

in relation to the world and the eternal purpose, his sense of responsibility continually expands. Without this light, however flickeringly and uncertainly it may shine behind the vapours of misunderstanding that obscure those four chief religions of the world instanced above, life would have no meaning, no object worth achieving. If evolution and development have no aim beyond a perfected materialism that must ultimately perish with the dying sun, we may well deny our belief in them, or rather regard them as a passing phase in the broad curve beyond our plotting, a phase that will presently pass the crest and decline into an undoing of that which has been uselessly done.

Nevertheless, this trilogy of Mr. Wells's, if it omits the one essential that would give it a permanent validity, is an intensely interesting commentary on the civilisation of the past six thousand years. We may smile at the author's naïf belief in machinery as the instrument of our social salvation, question his belief that the spirit of man will quicken to the call of a duty imposed solely by a hope for the welfare of a world we shall not live to enjoy. But if we read with a free mind the records he has so indefatigably gathered, we shall find that they are capable of another interpretation, that the tiny period of evolution he has covered is notable less for its scientific and mechanical achievements than for the evidence it displays of an in-

creasing humanitarianism, of an extension of individual and national consciousness, and of a spiritual development that will finally control all the activities of the world.

J. D. BERESFORD

The Elephant-Lore of the Hindus. Translated from the original Sanskrit with Introduction, Notes and Glossary, by FRANKLIN EDGERTON. (Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut and Oxford University Press, London. \$ 2)

Professor Edgerton, by his scholarly translation of the *Mātāṅga-līlā* or "Elephant-Sport" of Nilakanṭha has filled a gap that has long been conspicuous in the shelves of Western libraries. He has greatly enhanced the value of his work by the long explanatory introduction, and the references to parallel passages in other Sanskrit treatises on elephantology that serve to elucidate some of the obscurities of the text. The paucity of available literature in the English language on this important subject is really inexplicable in view of the prominent position the great beasts have occupied in India from very early times, and we are grateful that Professor Edgerton did not permit the existence of Zimmer's German translation to deter him from supplying an English version.

The Hindus regarded elephantology as a branch of the *Arthaśāstra*, the science of government, and it is instructive to note that the earliest Indian treatise on statecraft, the *Kauṭīliya Arthaśāstra* which is variously dated from ca. 300 B.C. to ca. 300 A.D., includes the oldest data we have on the subject, since when elephantology has never been excluded in any Hindu work on political science. The known texts unanimously attribute the founding of elephant-lore on a scientific basis to a mythical sage Pālakāpya, whose supernatural birth is described in the stanzas of the *Mātāṅga-līlā*. They also agree in making him reveal this knowledge first to an apparently mythical king, Romapāda of Aṅga. Professor Edgerton remarks that the three elephant books

known to him are all composed in the form of dialogues between these two personages. This repetition seems to make it clear that the mythic origin of elephants and of the sage Pālakāpya were part of the standard tradition.

It is a pure joy to read, even in translation, the poem of Nilakanṭha. We are mentally transported to the Golden Age when the gods walked and talked with men, when, as *The Secret Doctrine* teaches, "Inventors" were Gods and demi-gods (Devas and Rishis) who had become—some deliberately, some forced to by Karma—incarnated in man". (II, 373, foot-note.)

Pālakāpya "played with the elephants, their cows, and the young elephants, roaming with them through rivers and torrents, on mountain tops and in pools of water, and on pleasant spots of ground, living as a hermit on leaves and water, through years numbering twice six thousand, learning all about the elephants, what they should and should not eat, their joys and griefs, their gestures and so forth." (p. 46)

No wonder Pālakāpya could speak with authority on the subject! His work is extraordinarily inclusive, and ranges from the "caste" of elephants to "their daily and seasonal regiment," whilst a special chapter deals with the interesting pathological phenomenon peculiar to these great beasts known as "the state of *must*".

Finally, having portrayed all stages of the elephant's life from birth to death Pālakāpya says: "Thus, O king, having reached a hundred and twenty years, and having performed many kinds of work, the elephant goes to heaven."

M. OLDFIELD HOWEY

[Our reviewer is the author of *Horse in Magic and Myth*, *The Encircled Serpent*, *The Cat in the Mysteries of Religion and Magic*. —Eds.]

Etapas. By M. DUGARD (Éditions "Je Sers," Paris. 18 fcs.)

Readers of THE ARYAN PATH will recognize the name of the author of *Stepping Stones*. Mademoiselle Dugard was a frequent contributor to its pages, and in her death the journal loses a valued friend and sympathiser, one to whom the Theosophical ideal of Universal Brotherhood was a living reality. The Volume was all but ready at the close of 1931, but it fell to the lot of her editors to send it out to the world early in 1932 and they do it thus:—

From the Editors
This Book in which
MARIE DUGARD
1862—1931

Saw the culmination of her Labours and
which constitutes her Spiritual Will and
Testament.

A thought of Pascal reveals the purpose of the book and enlivens its titles: "The whole human race, throughout the succession of centuries, may be considered as one man,—ever living and continually learning."

Was Pascal intuitively feeling the fact of Reincarnation?

The stepping-stones of human progress are described in nine sections of the book, each with a suggestive title; each of them pertains to a definite period of European history. The slow unfoldment of unselfishness is traced, and progress is measured by spiritual values, not in terms of material comforts. The essential function of a civilization is "to create such conditions of life as will help man to kill the savage in him, and to realize himself as man". Our present problems are spiritual and must be solved through a religious ideal, for "man is a religious animal; do away with his religious life, and the animal alone will be left, and it is far from being beautiful." But religion is not sectarianism, or theological dogmatism; it is the force which unites a man to his fellows, enables him to sanctify all the duties and obligations of life, and prompts him to greater spiritual achievements. This is Marie Dugard's philoso-

phy, and those who knew her personally know full well that she taught it by example as well as by precept.

The author paints a series of word-pictures in which human characters act out their parts and speak their lives, against an actual historical background; we are made to live over again the historical events which shaped the destiny of Europe. The characters are not heroes of those events, but they reflect in the routine of their lives the spirit of the age to which they belong. These also reveal the friendliness, the kind sense of humour, the delightful human touch, and intimacy with humanity so characteristic of Marie Dugard. Her pictorial method and her style hold the attention of the reader and many will absorb the serious thoughts of *Etapas* who would never touch a volume of essays, historical or philosophical. Further, the book brings out most effectively the silent parts played by common humble folk in the building of nations and the moulding of civilizations.

The reader is gently awakened to a sense of his own responsibility. This awakening is in preparation for the assimilation of the author's message so forcefully delivered in the last section—"Au Large". The writer maintains her impersonality in these stirring pages, and yet the reader strongly feels her earnestness and sincerity. That we read that message after the death of Mademoiselle Dugard adds to its impressiveness. "At High Sea" pictures our day: On a transatlantic liner from New York to Liverpool, a European, an American, a Hindu are interviewed by a journalist from the United States; a young Frenchman sums up the discussions and the views, bringing out their merits and messages. The failings of European, American, and Indian civilizations are sternly condemned, and in suggesting remedies the first task is—give up pride, individual and national, and develop the strength of dispassionate self-criticism.

To recognize our weaknesses—that is the first step. Each nation must develop

along the line of its own inherent genius, and each must make its contribution to the progress of the race as a whole, for interdependence is the basis of life itself. India has a message for the West, but so has the West for India. In mutually helping each other, both will eliminate the evils of their own civilizations and strengthen the good of their own cultures.

The last section sums up the whole book and brings out the spiritual Ideal which inspired Marie Dugard. The closing touch is fine. With a quotation

The Legacy of Islam. Edited, by the late Sir THOMAS ARNOLD and ALFRED GUILLAUME. (Oxford University Press, London. 10s.)

The Legacy of Islam describes the contribution of the Arabs to arts, sciences, and literature, and is therefore essentially a cultural history of the Arabs. The time covered is from the rise of Islam to the fall of the caliphate of Baghdad; the extent in space is from Spain and Portugal to Central Asia; and the legacy bequeathed is generally the learning of the Greeks preserved in Arabic translations and, to a smaller extent, original contributions where the Arabs supplemented and improved upon Greek thought. A work, therefore, so extensive in time, space, and subject-matter runs the risk of becoming superficial, but the *Legacy of Islam* is not superficial. Each chapter has been written by an expert: Spain and Portugal, by J. B. Trend; the Crusades, by Ernest Barker; Geography and Commerce, by J. H. Kramers; Islamic minor arts and their influence upon European work, by A. H. Christie; Painting, by the late Sir Thomas Arnold; Architecture, by Martin S. Briggs; Literature, by H. A. R. Gibb; Mysticism, by R. A. Nicholson; Philosophy and Theology, by Alfred Guillaume; Law and Society, by David de Santillana; Science and Medicine, by Max Meyerhof; Music, by H. G. Farmer; and Astronomy and Mathematics, by Carra de Vaux: and the combined result is a first-rate production, which

from Victor Hugo she glimpses the grandeur of the future:—

Already, love in the obscure era
Which is coming to an end
Traces the vague outline
Of the Future.

In order that this "already" may not be too premature it is necessary for each one to begin, on this very day to love his fellow as himself.

Quo Vadis? Humanity, embarked on the Ocean of Life, thou knowest it not..... But whatever the winds and the storms which seem to threaten the ships, fear not: the master is aboard and "the spirit of God moveth on the Waters."

C.

bears the impress of authority and which presents in one volume and in excellent English almost the whole range of Islamic studies.

In the Middle Ages, Arabs were the transmitters of learning to Europe: the translation school of al-Ma'mūn and al-Mutawakkil at Baghdad was the envy of scholars, and Cordoba, with its 70 libraries and 900 public baths, was the most civilized city in Europe. Avicenna, al-Farābī, and Algazel introduced Aristotle to Europe; the Muslim philosopher and physicist al-Kindī (d. 873) produced no less than 265 works; and the Christian physician Hunayn (d. 877) translated the whole immense corpus of Galenic writings. Several books of Galen, 3 books of the *Conics* of Apollonius, the *Spherics* of Menelaus, the *Mechanics* of Hero of Alexandria, the *Pneumatics* of Philo of Byzantium, the *balance* of Euclid, the *clepsydra* of Archimedes—these are amongst the Greek writings whose originals are lost and whose preservation is due entirely to their Arabic translations.

More interesting, however, are the original contributions of the Arabs. In mathematics, the Arabs taught the use of ciphers (Ar. *Sifr*, empty), developed algebra (Ar. *al-jabr*, restitution), improved analytical geometry, and founded plane and spherical trigonometry. The formulæ $\sin \alpha = \frac{\tan \alpha}{\sqrt{1 + \tan^2 \alpha}}$; $\cos \alpha = \frac{1}{\sqrt{1 + \tan^2 \alpha}}$ of al-Battānī and

$$\sin (a+b) = \frac{\sin a \cos b + \sin b \cos a}{R}$$

of Abu'l-Wafā, the cubic equations of 'Umar Khayyām, the solution by al-Qūhī of an unproved lemma of Archimedes, the invention (in arithmetic) of the proof "by casting out the nines," the rule of the double false position, the perfection, (in astronomy) of the sphere of Ptolemy, and the rule (in plane and spherical trigonometry) of the supplementary figure of Nasīru'd-Dīn Tūsī are positive additions to mathematical thought. In science, Abū Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī (d. 1048) determined almost exactly the specific weight of 18 precious stones and metals; Jābir (10th century), the father of alchemy (Ar. al-Kīmīyā), improved methods for evaporation, filtration, crystallization, sublimation etc., prepared cinnabar, arsenious oxide, crude sulphuric and nitric acids, etc., and bequeathed to the modern chemist words like realgar, alkali, antimony, tutia, alembic and aludel. But "the glory of Muslim science is in the field of optics: here the mathematical ability of an Alhazen (Abu 'Alī al-Ḥasan ibn al-Haytham of Baṣra, c. 965, the discoverer of Alhazen's problem and of camera obscura) and a Kamālu'd-Dīn (d. 1320) outshone that of Euclid and Ptolemy".

In architecture, the pointed arch and the ogee arch, cusps and cusped arches, engaged shafts at the angles of piers, ornamental and pierced battlements, inscriptions in Kufic characters, striped façades, arabesques and the use of geometrical patterns are specific instances of the indebtedness of Europe to Islam, whilst in music, the words lute (Ar. al-'ūd), rebec (Ar. rabāb), guitar (Ar. qitāra), naker (Ar. naqqāra, hocket (Ar. iqā'āt, rhythm), elmuahyn and elmuarifa are purely Arabian, as is also mensural music which has been described in a work by al-Kindī (d. 873). Al-Farābī's *Grand book on Music* was written to fill gaps in the musical know-

ledge of the Greeks, and the use of the Major 7th of the scale as a leading note to the tonic, and experiments in the spherical propagation of sound and with the neutral third of Zalzal $\frac{3}{2}$ and the Persian third $\frac{8}{6}$ come also under the same category.

In medicine, the first clear knowledge of small-pox and measles was propounded by Rhazes (al-Rāzī, d. 925) in his treatise on these subjects; Greek knowledge of ophthalmology was increased by the Christian Jesu Haly ('Alī ibn 'Īsā) of Baghdad and the Muslim Canamusali ('Ammār) of Mosul whose treatises on eye-diseases, composed about 1000 A.D., remained standard-works as late as 1750 A.D.; and the infectious character of plague was first discussed by Ibn al-Khaṭīb (d. 1374) in his treatise on the plague. The great reputation of Avicenna (Abū 'Alī al-Ḥusayn ibn Sīnā d. 1037) and Averroes (Ibn Rushd d. 1198) rests not on original discoveries but on their marvellous systematization of medical knowledge displayed in the *Canon* and the *Colliget* respectively.

In commerce and economics, Europe has inherited from the Arabs the conception of the joint-stock company (which arose from the partnership of Muslim and Italian merchants), the institution of limited partnership (qirād), and words like muslin (from Mosul), damask (from Damascus), baldachin (a stuff made in Bagh'dad), gauze, cotton, satin, traffic (Ar. tafriq), tariff (Ar. ta'rif) magazine (Ar. makhāzīn), cheque, calibre, risk, tare, mobatra, douane, aval, etc. In Spain and Portugal, naturally, the reflex-effect of Arab culture and dominance has been far greater: there is a whole vocabulary of hybrid words of Moorish—Spanish origin.

Elsewhere too in philosophy, mysticism, and literature the influence of Islam on European thought is not wanting. *The Legacy of Islam* is a fascinating book, rich in facts and detail, and full of information both literary and scientific.

HĀDĪ ḤASAN

Talks with Spirit Friends, Bench and Bar. Being descriptions of the next World and its activities by well-known persons who live there, given through the trance mediumship of the late Miss Sara Harris to a Retired Public Servant. (John M. Watkins, London. 7s. 6d.)

The nature of this book is indicated by its title. It is dreary, for the "well-known persons," who are said to be responsible for the bulk of its contents, appear to have lost in the process of dying all the wit and wisdom, which belonged to some of them at least while in the flesh.

Several of them, when alive, were famous English jurists, pre-eminently skilled in the art of stating a case with accuracy and eloquence, and expert in marshalling and weighing evidence; but their ghosts are prosy, mediocre, and utterly unconvincing. The descriptions they give of the "Summerland" read rather like the advertisements of a speculative builder booming the merits of some suburban estate. They tell us about the "cities, towns and undulating countries" of the after-death world; of its "boroughs and municipalities, and all the paraphernalia to instil knowledge"; of "well-paved streets, broad thoroughfares, stately houses and magnificent scenery"; of a post-mortem

"sanatorium," where "stringed music" is "mingled with sways of branches and singing of beautifully coloured birds," and nurses are "flitting here and there with cordials and fruits"; the beds, usual in mundane hospitals, being replaced by "silken hammocks" with silver supports!

One famous judge tells us that he is now engaged as "a sort of administrator over a certain territory"; a learned counsel has "been appointed senior master of an academy"; a once noted admiral still raves at the folly of "damned land-lubbers"; another learned counsel, famous for his wit while living, makes frequent feeble attempts to crack jokes from behind the veil, but death has rubbed all the edge off his humour. This kind of thing goes wearily on through 226 closely printed demy octavo pages.

Needless to say that all the communicators have much to tell us about the benevolence of the personal god who is supposed to have designed this delectable other-world of theirs.

That this extremely unspiritual twaddle can find readers who take it seriously, is a striking proof of the crass materialism of the people to whom it appeals. We would like to think that they are not typical of the spiritualist body as a whole.

R. A. V. M.

Kandan the Patriot. By K. S. VENKATARAMANI (Svetaranya Ashrama, Mylapore, Madras. Rs. 2.)

The reader finds much food for thought in this book, which presents with startling clearness, the picture of a great country faced with the disaster of betrayal at the hands of her own sons. The action centres chiefly around a group of young people who have spent some years studying at Oxford. On returning to India, several bend all their energies toward helping their native land, but others, tainted with the fever of power and ambition, have thought of nothing but personal advancement. At the strategic moment, however, they awaken to the realization of their res-

ponsibility, and from that time on they are willing to sacrifice everything, even life if need be.

Such is the unusual picture given to the world by one who knows and deplores the present conditions of his country. The author points out, how even the politics of the country need undergo a change. He makes the reader feel the tremendous importance of the duty centred in each individual, a true definition of which cannot be better expressed than in the words of Madame Blavatsky, (*The Key to Theosophy*, p. 192, Indian Edition) when she says that "Duty is that which is due to Humanity, to our fellow-men, neighbours, family, and especially that which we owe to all those who are

poorer and more helpless than we are ourselves".

The book is timely, and comes at a critical period in the history of India though it is in no wise partisan. The reform on which it lays stress is that which comes from within—the awakening of each individual to his own responsibility. Once again we are re-

mined of *The Key to Theosophy*, (p. 194) by Madame Blavatsky where she says so truly :—

To seek to achieve political reforms before we have effected a reform in human nature, is like putting new wine into old bottles. Make men feel and recognize in their innermost hearts what is their real, true duty to all men, and every old abuse of power . . . will disappear.

P. F.

Experiences Facing Death. By MARY AUSTIN (Rider and Co., London. 7s. 6d.)

Miss Austin has given us an interesting and suggestive, but withal somewhat disappointing book. She sets out "to study. . . the movement of experience as we go toward death"; and to show what light is thrown on the problems of death and survival by the psychic and spiritual experience of mankind. The work is of value, because it records the inner adventures of a gifted and thoughtful woman, and contains many illuminating observations by the way. It is, however, incoherent in method, and achieves no very definite result. Miss Austin is rather like one who knows all there is to know about a labyrinth except the secret way to the centre. As a guide, she leads us round and round, and finally "out by the same door as in we went".

Over and over again, when reading the book, we light upon a brilliantly intuitive passage, and seem to be on the brink of some vital discovery, only to be switched off suddenly to another topic.

Miss Austin's own religious experiences have been wide and varied. She has practised the rites of the Indian tribes, among whom she lived in Mexico; she has gone through the Spiritual Exercises of Ignatius Loyola under a Jesuit director; and has learned Yoga practices from a Swami. She has "made her soul" by listening to the "Pyrrhic rhythms of the Medicine Drum," and by undergoing the experi-

ation rituals of the Catholic *Hermanos Penitentes*. She has also studied modern psychology. But, in her search for enlightenment, Miss Austin seems to have neglected the chief source of light. *Ex Oriente Lux*, says the proverb; but she has turned away from the spiritual East, to focus her gaze on dimmer lamps elsewhere. To reincarnation, she devotes only a few lines, setting it aside for further evidence. To Karma she refers not at all.

Her quest for information about death and its sequel in the mental life of the living would have been more fruitful, had Miss Austin started out with some knowledge of the psychology of the great religions of the East, which explains what in us is eternal, what temporal. She is convinced of our "everlastingness," but is vague as to what in us is everlasting.

Everlastingness implies pre-existence. That one is born on the blank day of blank, and will live eternally, is unthinkable. If death be but a portal, then so is birth; and we may form some notion of what the real self takes out with him through the gate of death by considering what he brings in with him through the gate of birth. If he enters life equipped with tendencies, affinities, character; may we not assume that he carries these with him when he leaves it? Personal memory he neither brings nor takes; for memory survives only as character, which is its quintessence.

There are many passages in the book which are epigrammatic and quotable.

R. A. V. M.

Hypnotism: Black Magic In Science. By H. P. BLAVATSKY. U. L. T. Pamphlet, No. 19. [Theosophy Company (India) Ltd., Bombay.]

This pamphlet is one of those later editorial articles in *Lucifer* in which Mme. Blavatsky gave some details and hints concerning the rationale of the "secret arts" and explained the dangers inherent in their practice. Interest in hypnotism was then epidemic in Europe and America: it has since become endemic and assumed many forms.

In this article a bird's-eye view is given of the history of magnetic healing from ancient times down to 1890 when Charcot and his school flourished and Braid had invented the word "hypnotism" to disconnect the "new" discovery from the work of the academically discredited Mesmer and his followers. Mme. Blavatsky points out that these amateur "hypnotists" of science were trying to use the laws of an ancient science which they did not understand; and, therefore, they were unconscious of the disastrous consequences of these practices known then and since to many physicians.

Official science turned a blind eye on the random experiments, in a dangerous field of science, undertaken by novices—men of science as well as "laymen"—without theorems to guide them or teachers to instruct them. It overlooked the rule of honour, observed within its own societies, which acknowledges the priority of an experimental demonstration and publication of facts. If it had recognised this, inquiry might have been turned on the principles behind the facts of "Mesmer-

ism" and "hypnotism" that had been repeatedly recorded in previous centuries and at that time by du Potet and others. But, as science does not admit officially that Will is an energy which sets other energies in motion, nothing was done to restrict experiments with this penetrating power to those properly qualified by character, motive and discipline.

On the positive side science has foolishly maintained that the "Animal Magnetism" of Paracelsus, Kircher, Mesmer and other magnetic healers is a chimera; for the assertion that there is only one kind of magnetism—the electro-magnetism of physics—has at last been disproved by biologists who now describe biological states in terms of electro-magnetic "systems"; although it is not yet known how the various systems of an organism are synthesized or polarized.

Hypnotists and psycho-analysts are still permitted in the name of science to *vivisect* or *depolarize* human beings, to "unseal" what the alchemists sought to "seal" and heal; because it is not realized how these experiments break the magnetic insulation of the subject and so induce psycho-physiological and moral disintegration. However, Mme. Blavatsky's explanation in this article regarding the "active living germs of mental and physical ills" that invade a hypnotized subject, ought to be understood to-day in view of recent discoveries that many diseases are transmitted by "invisible, ultra-microscopic agencies of an entirely different order from microbes".

W. W. L.

Kabir and His Followers. By the REV. F. E. KEAY, D. LITT. (Association Press, Calcutta. Oxford University Press, London. 5s.)

An emaciated little old man sits under the cool shade of a mango-grove working at his loom, his frail olive body glowing almost red with the warmth of the torrid Sun. From under the thin muslin cap a plain surface of grey white

hair declines on his temples to define the expression of his face as the index of a soul which has battled against and been beaten out by the world, though exalted by God to saintliness. A disciple sits on his right; on his left a musician is straining the chords of a lute. The saint of God, the weaver's shuttle in his hands, is arrested in a dumb ecstasy by the very music of his own song.

Dr. Keay reproduces as *frontispiece* this picture of Kabir painted by a 17th century Moghal artist. Thereby unfortunately the author puts his own portrait of the reformer to rather unflattering comparisons. For, while the masterly brush of the Moghal painter has evoked the spirit of Kabir Dr. Keay has statistically mounted fact upon fact in certain dry-as-dust chapters on Kabir and some of his followers, unilluminated by any charm of narrative and devoid even of the saving grace of dialectical subtlety. Still facts about a man so surrounded by fiction as Kabir are welcome, specially as Dr. Keay has often collected them by first hand inspection of the various places connected with the life of Kabir and by original researches into the literature of the Kabir Panth, and they supply excellent material from which the creative imagination of any interested reader may draw a suitable picture.

Kabir was born about the early half of the fifteenth century to a Muhammadan weaver named Niru and his wife Nima at the holy city of Benares. It was an extremely disturbed era: Hinduism and Islam were at loggerheads and concentrated on flaunting their respective dogmas against each other while their own houses were far from being in order. The sensitive child was dazed as much by the fanaticism and bigotry with which his co-religionists butchered the Hindus and destroyed their shrines as by the wanton brutality by which the Brahmins treated the lower castes, condemning one fourth of humanity to the living death of untouchability. He had heard the doctrines of the Sufis from his parents and found them not to be very different in spirit from the tenets of devotional Hinduism which were then being preached by Ramananda, the great Vaishnava reformer. He became a disciple of the Hindu sage and after the master's death himself began to preach a mixture of Hinduism and Islam. One of the earliest thoughts he is said to have uttered is significant of this attitude:

O holy men! I have seen the way of both,
Hindus and Turks heed no warning; to all
the taste of their desires is sweet.

Says Kabir, Listen, O holy men: cry
'Rama'; cry 'Khuda'; it is all one!

His mature thought contains a wealth of very pungent yet refined verse criticism of priest-ridden Hinduism and intolerant Islam for which we must be grateful, not only because it brought a new message of hope to the age in which it found utterance but because it has a peculiar relevancy to our own century steeped in the same bloody rivalries which Kabir sought to placate. Our gratitude is the more intense when we realise that most of what Kabir taught, he acutely suffered for. Sikandar Lodi, the Pathan King, tortured him with unspeakable cruelty for proclaiming so beautiful a truth as this:

For him who sows thorns for thee, do thou
sow flowers.

For thee the harvest will be flowers; but for
him sharp pains.

The Brahmins whose parrot-like repetition of the holy *mantras* had evoked Kabir's censure, cast upon him the stigma of being a low-caste weaver, but he responded—

Thou art a Brahmin, I am a weaver of
Benares; how can I be a match for thee?

By repeating the name of God I may be
saved; while thou, O Pandit, shall be lost for
trusting the words of the *Veda*.

The pedantry of the priestly versions of the *Upanishads* and the flowery verbiage of post-classical Pauranic literature frightened him, although he accepted the *Upanishadic* doctrines of *Karma* (law of action and reaction) and *Samsara* (universe), the initiation of a disciple through the Divine Word by the *Guru* (Master), etc., he never made any very serious attempt to evolve a coherent system of theology or metaphysics. There is in his recorded sayings about God a persistent flaw. Now his God possesses all the attributes of a person to be worshipped with love and devotion; and then He becomes the pantheistic, abstract, quality-less Absolute,

Kabir's legacy to posterity would not have been anything but a strange motley of Hindu and Muhammadan habiliments had it not been that he was blessed with an extraordinary gift for music and song. He would go about singing his exquisitely melodious harmonies: he would answer people's inquiries in verse, he would refute the arguments of his adversaries in a subtle rhyme, he would sermonise by singing a song, and the music of his verse and the doctrines of his belief would steal into people's hearts before they knew they had been converted.

Religion, Morals and the Intellect.
By F. E. POLLARD. (George Allen
& Unwin Ltd., London. 5s.)

Mr. Pollard, treading his way through the perplexities of life and thought, defends Reason as a reliable guide to the most significant truth for men. The present tendency to relegate the intellect to a subordinate position, he thinks, is due partly to its rejection of particular beliefs which have held sway over the religious mind of the past; partly to fear of the consequences of thought and partly to an inherent and vitiating departmentalism. But reason, the author holds, is the human spirit seeking reality; it is "the impulse to harmonize and unify". Since the mind of man is "the power which collects and classifies phenomena, gives form and system to the medley of impressions, constructs purposes and weighs values," Mr. Pollard contends that it can be of great service to human activity and progress. In the cause of religion and conduct, he maintains, the intellect must defend a truly spiritual religion. In other words, it should carry on an incessant warfare against the insidious relics of magic and superstition which abound, and against the present bewildering tendency to devise and follow new forms of sorcery, unreason and all the unmeaning irrelevancies of the occult.

Strange as it may seem, it is not the wonders of science that appeal to the

The result is that though he never sought to found a sect, we see to-day, according to Dr. Keay, some millions of the people of India divided into twelve or even more, strong sects, which seek inspiration from Kabir's many different and often inconsistent social and religious ideals; and though he made no pretensions to learning (and was, indeed, often crude in his grammar and diction) "his words can," on the authority of so eminent a linguist as Sir George Grierson, "still be heard in every village of Hindustan".

MULK RAJ ANAND

common mass but the wonders of unreason. Since a world of tricks, where none can trace the how and why, is preferred to one of ordered purpose, our author's thesis is that the combating of this tendency,—the tendency to bow to the power of authority without personal conviction,—is an important part reason could play in meeting the needs of to-day. This attitude is Theosophical.

In the second place, Mr. Pollard contends that in the working out of a sound psychology which, while making full use of the added modern understanding of instinct, self-activity, suggestion, sublimation and the distortions due to unremembered shocks and strains, will reassert the unity of the mind's life and reinstate ideals and conscious purposes in their supreme place as the growing points of the spirit of man, the intellect can render a real service to humanity. Further, the author maintains that the intellect must be of help in leading men generally to a belief in the reality and power in the unseen world. The most serious opposition to his ideas on this matter will come, as the author is aware, from those who maintain the imaginative nature of religion which inevitably personifies or presents ideal distinctions in the guise of concrete objects. Nevertheless, the author is absolutely right in his firm stand that the mind should not be in bondage to its images,—and idolatry takes many

forms,—but make them the servants of a deeper and more fruitful understanding. Lastly, he maintains that the intellect should help in the rehabilitation of morality, and the replacement of its undetermined and crumbled basis of authority by an intrinsic, natural and rational foundation.

The burden of Mr. Pollard's message is that man has infinite possibilities of effort and intelligence; the more we emphasize the understanding side of man's nature, the more we trust his intelligence, the more fully will it rise to heights otherwise impossible. If any one supposes that Religion and Reason are poles asunder, our author is here to disillusion him. He finds so much in common between them that it would be

strange for him to find them to be antagonists. Enthusiastically does he point out that both of them seek for harmony and unity and refuse to take a departmental view of life. It is small wonder therefore, if, in spite of the difficulties of the problems involved in the issues of authority and tradition versus personal search and conviction, of felt experience versus intelligent interpretation, Mr. Pollard chooses to err, if he errs at all, on the side of human intellect, and of defending its ways and aspirations, rather than on the side of the arbitrary and the irrational. In fighting thus the cause of Reason in Religion and Morals, our author has given us a thoughtful, lucid and stimulating book.

JAGADISAN M. KUMARAPPA

Twentieth-Century Addresses. By PROF. E. C. DICKINSON and PROF. DIWAN CHAND SHARMA. (Macmillan & Co. London. 3s. 6d.)

If Indian students are impatient of authority, it is perhaps because they are invited to improve their minds by such anthologies as this. The idea of serving up to young men in the new Indian universities a collection of recent addresses by famous men is no doubt an excellent way of acquainting them with passably good English "as she is spoke". But when these addresses are carefully chosen for moral edification, for inspiring hero-worship, "as an antidote to aggressive patriotism" (as the preface tells us), or in short, for any reason but their own sake, they take on an air of propaganda. At worst they lapse into academic prosing, as does the address of Mr. Asquith on "Criticism".

The truth is that a great address usually depends on a great occasion. The late M. Briand made such an address when he welcomed Germany for the first time into membership of the League of Nations. An address of this kind, great in itself, is more truly enlarging to the mind than one delivered in academic robes before a lethargic

Senate house. But even the academic addresses are ill-chosen. Surely Sir J. M. Barrie on "Courage" would have been better than Mr. Baldwin on "Truth and Politics".

There are perhaps two addresses only which justify their choice for this anthology—Sir Rabindranath Tagore on "My School," and Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch on "Jargon". Would that all schools could, like Tagore's, be founded on the traditions of the forest colonies of Indian teachers. Would that all writers of English could take to heart Q's brilliant and amusing dissection of the lazy, fogging, shuffling habit of jargon. There is little permanent worth in the address of Lord Rosebery, given in 1913, on "The Power and Responsibility of the Press". It dates already. The addresses of the scholarly politicians, Lord Balfour, Lord Haldane, Mr. Baldwin, Lord Morley, and Mr. Sastri, are singularly dull, despite their polished phrasing and learned quotations. That of Mr. Galsworthy is, of course, vital and sincere, but sadly disjointed.

If there is a moral in this book it is that an anthology should not try to point morals, even with the aid of the biggest names in politics.

G. W. WHITEMAN

CORRESPONDENCE

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

In *Nature*, March 7, 1931, p. 340, I pointed out that the modern etymology of the word "philosophy" has not been accepted by all scholars. Professor Wadia, (*THE ARYAN PATH*, January 1932, p. 10), assumes that it means "love of truth," and others describe a philosopher as a "lover of wisdom". M. Ragon, the French authority of the last century on the Egyptian Mysteries, identified *Philo* with *Pothos* (from which *Eros* is derived) the universal, creative energy of Nature. Hence *Philosophia* originally signified knowledge of the creating energies within objective phenomena; and a *philosopher* one who had assimilated in himself, or personified, as it were, creative knowledge and could experimentally demonstrate it. If the tradition be true that Pythagoras refused to allow himself to be called a philosopher he must have known *scientific* philosophers of greater knowledge than himself.

Reasoning,* in the modern philosophical meaning, that is *speculative thinking*, has not as such contributed to the advancement of knowledge, either in the East or the West. The activity in the search for the knowledge that has been noticeable in the West since the "Revival of Learning" has been due to experimental research. Francis Bacon, the supposed founder of experimental science, warned experimentalists against the Idols of the Mind† formed by speculative thought; and he considered that the philosophical speculations of the schoolmen were a barrier to open-minded investigations of Nature and had added nothing to human knowledge.

It is difficult to see where there is any advance in modern "philosophical thought" *as apart from scientific know-*

ledge, over the abortive postulates of the Mediæval "philosophers" of Europe. After the Renaissance European thinkers had the ancient literature of Greece (originally influenced by Egypt and India) to stimulate their ideas. Descartes, Leibnitz and Spinoza were *intuitive* thinkers and may have inspired experimental researches indirectly, especially Descartes; but modern *knowledge* of the principles operating in Nature is due to pioneer workers, such as Paracelsus and Roger Bacon, both acknowledged now by official science.

Western scholars have proved conclusively that modern science owes its inception to students of ancient literatures and exponents of the traditional knowledge of Eastern peoples. It did not rise *de novo* in Europe. And it seems certain that the distinction obtaining to-day between "science" and "philosophy" originated in the West. This distinction is artificial and may, in the end, be fatal to the advancement of knowledge, scientific workers succumb to the lure of speculative thinking and Idealism, as seems now to be the tendency.

The antithesis of "philosophy" and "religion," or of "science" and "religion," is also superficial. As "philosophers" originally obtained the data on which to speculate from scientific knowledge, so the doctrines of the various religions were derived from the experiences of scientific philosophers, in M. Ragon's sense. This knowledge was diluted and perverted to suit the desires and mentality of the populace.‡ Prof. Wadia shows how philosophy degenerated into theology in India and has been used to keep the masses of the people in thrall to superstition and false gods. But would it have been so mis-

* Originally, to reason meant to deal with ratios, just as *Mathesis* meant *proportion*; but both reasoning and mathematics have long since become speculative. Their symbols may denote merely arbitrary values, and the premises of a theory or argument be hypothetical and not in accordance with the actual nature of things. Thus many contradictory theories are evolved by speculation.

† See Section II, *Novum Organum*, also *Preliminaries of De Augmentis Scientiarum*.

‡ See, *The Asiatic Review*, October 1931, p. 764.

used if it had not repudiated or misinterpreted the science which gave it birth? The same thing happened in Europe, and the organized religion of the West has not been more "exalted" than that of India. The only difference to-day is that it has lost its hold on the masses in Europe but still has a subtle hold on the mentality of some of the intellectual classes by means of (1) the hereditary notion of an extracosmic god, and (2) a "mystical philosophy" peculiarly characteristic of the West.

Priest-craft is a fine art. It adapts its "philosophy" to the times. It is now taking advantage of the reaction from the exclusively physical interpretations of the universe and the premature nihilistic conclusions of modern science. It is encouraging speculative thinking for very good reasons, namely: that "systems of thought" are always coloured by the peculiar temperament of the thinker, and this human idiosyncrasy is known to be more often emotional than rational. Man is never satisfied for long by an explanation of the world that is obvious to the superficial senses. He craves some emotional, if not miraculous, ingredient. These desires of the populace are satisfied by the sensational effects of rituals; those of certain intellectual classes by the emotional effects of "mystical" ideas, so-called "spiritual truths".

As the West has only one word, "spirit," which denotes not only its anthropomorphic god, but also *alcohol*, *spirited* animals, "manifestations of spirits" at séances, and *spiritual* visions of neurotic mystics, Indian metaphysicians might be justified in doubting the *Atmic* quality of the "spiritual peaks" of Western philosophy.

Whether in the East or the West a scientific philosopher could only refer to "spirit" as energy, the opposite polarity of the energy known to man as "matter". The state or "frequency-level" of spirit must be beyond man's physico-mental perceptions. If it be possible to know those ultra-physical states they could not be described in terms of men's present knowledge; and

it is presumptuous and unscientific to attempt to discuss the Absolute—perpetual, ceaseless Motion, with the finite, concrete mind.

Just as states of atomic physics cannot be interpreted in terms of molar physics nor explained to a mere mechanical engineer, so one would logically conclude that states of ultra-physical (or spiritual) atomic reactions could not be discussed in terms of the "energy supplied by the West," or, indeed, of the energy emanating from any part of the known world to-day.

London

W. W. L.

IN VINDICATION OF VEGETARIANISM

The vegetarian holds that the eating of animal corpses, though it may befit animal scavengers, is not consistent with the evolutionary status of man.

Man's chief patrimony was evolved during a period of protracted arboreal existence, when he was largely a vegetarian. In Java, for instance, aboriginal forest dwellers have been observed to wander about, changing their abode according to the fruits in season in the various localities. Such and similar observations confirm the view that primitive man was not as a rule a habitual slaughterer or devourer of other animals.

In their work on *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo*, Dr. Hose and Dr. McDougall point out that the Punans are the finest of the people of Borneo. They are so primitive, so uncivilised, that they cultivate no crops and have no domesticated animals. They live entirely upon the wild produce of the jungle. Comparison with the natural history of social animals allows the inference that the Punans are mainly vegetarian, a conclusion that seems further corroborated by the data supplied by the afore-mentioned observers. For they tell us that the sole handicrafts of these primitive people are the making of baskets, mats, blow-pipes, and the implements used for working the wild sago. All other manufactured articles used by them, including swords and spears, they obtain

by barter from other peoples. Like many vegetarian social animals, they are strictly monogamous and reliable in character, helping, instead of eating one another in danger and in decrepitude.

There is evidence to show that lapse into scavengerdom was the chief cause of the decline and extinction of many human species in the past. According to the laws of organic interdependence, to abuse animals to the extent of killing them for the sake of their flesh constitutes an excess of exploitation and in fact a form of parasitism. The best and most ideal biological relation is, on the contrary, one in which the exchange of services between species and species is not carried to the point of parasitic murder. It should be remembered in this connection that in Nature the sequel to parasitism is everywhere this calamitous degeneracy. Truly was it said by Emerson that "to receive services and render none in return is the one base thing in the universe".

In the old days, the advocacy of slavery was carried on in much the same hypocritical way as is to-day the defence of meat-eating. Slavery, the casuists said, may be "against the law of Nature"; but it was "according to the law of nations". To such pleaders amenity is the sole appeal, both in physiological and in ethical relations—a dangerous position from more than one point of view. The vegetarian appeal, *per contra*, is to eternal justice, regarding which Edmund Burke wrote that it is the one thing, the only one thing which defies all mutation; that it existed before the world, and will survive the fabric of the world itself. It is debasing also, to depute to others the brutalising work of slaughtering. Again, such practices cannot but react unfavourably upon the morale of the community. We speak of "butcherliness," to denote brutal, cruel, and savage manners.

The mammalia, in particular, which we slaughter for culinary purposes, are our close kin in the evolutionary scale. It is one of the marks of the true parasite that it feeds upon substance, which have already been built up and organised

into a close similarity with its own bodily fabric. Perpetual "in-feeding" of this sort is evil and "abhorred by Nature," since it abuses a biologically essential chain of processes by which we turn vegetable substances into flesh, just as plants build up their organic matter from mineral. Involved is here "Evolution by Co-operation".

Think ye that the mighty result of evolution is so easily obtained that it should not matter what one eats and what one does? Believe ye that nothing but amenity and expediency count, that species have but to eat one another for progressive syntheses to result? Alas, the world is governed with very little wisdom! Alas too, "there is no health in us!" When our monetary currency goes wrong, we usually know what is the cause of it. Well known for instance, is the debasing effect of bad coins. The rule is that bad currency drives out good. A good currency, moreover, has a legitimate basis in service and in work. It is not obtained for nothing, not by the mere printing of notes for instance, *i. e.* by neglecting the matter of redemption—the *quid pro quo*. Benefit is the end of Nature, but for every benefit obtained a toll is levied. Our physiological currency also needs a legitimate basis in service, failing which it becomes debased, thus landing us in disease and in degeneration, of which, alas, we can boast a rich measure. The more a man becomes a beef-eater, the less will the care for instance for fruits—bad coinage driving out good. Such an one, moreover, becomes the possessor of all manner of noxious micro-organisms, the need of placation of which takes him still further away from the pathway of legitimacy. His adaptation is along the path of the wolf, the hyena, the lion and the tiger—outlaws, which the evolutionary process is about to throw on the rubbish heap. "The faults of this western world are hideous," says Prof. Gilbert Murray, "the taint runs through it of blood and of alcohol. It is stamped by the institution of war, by the degradation of the poor, by drink, gambling, vice." Those pimply, ponder-

ous, encumbered people whom one still meets abundantly, they are diseased and the victims of meat-eating habits past and present. Their appearance is enough to make one apply to modern England what Bebel, the Socialist, said of pre-war Germany: "only a great misfortune can save us". Had not the war, with its sufferings, acted as an eye-opener, we should still probably be little sensitive on the subject of food.

I am satisfied, on empirical grounds alone that most of our diseases are due to our wrong feeding habits. There is, moreover, plentiful experimental evidence to show that habitual in-feeding actually does act injuriously and debasingly. The experiments of Richet's school, in particular, have shown that the (protein) of one animal, applied to that of another, acts deleteriously and that the system in order to defend its individuality has to defend itself against such intrusions, it being thus confirmed that there is a natural and universal revulsion to predatory methods of life. All of which shows that our salvation lies in the avoidance of short-cuts for that is what carnivorousness, in common parlance, amounts to. It is with health and evolution precisely as it is with character. They cannot be won by short-cuts, but must be created by genuine *i. e.*, legitimate, activity. Just as character is the abiding product of an innumerable series of thoughts and deeds appearing singly of little consequence, but growing through the slow accretions of habit to its ultimate stature, so our physiological or "humoral" personality (determined by "humours") is the product of countless ingestions and (protein) intoxications, which by their cumulative effects, have altered each of us, leaving indelible effects. The self-indulgent man, fond of taking the short cut, is quite blind to the truth that health and evolution walk on the road of biological "righteousness," *i. e.*, legitimacy. To forsake the true road of life—the road of "cross-feeding," consistent with the established order of Nature, —is to foreswear the great goal of life. It

may here be recalled that Darwin spoke of "felony" in the case of bees obtaining supplies of nectar by short cuts, instead of getting them "legitimately" *i. e.*, non-parasitically. If we dodge our normal biological tasks, we shall find that in the end obstacles bulk the more formidably. Modern civilisation will have to decide, sooner or later, whether it will abandon the path of scavengerdom, or take the alternative course of developing into a race of hopeless valetudinarians, obliged to augment their already swollen army of doctors and nurses, until all citizens,—subject, by their feeding habits, to cancer, pneumonia, rheumatism, influenza, and a host of other "mysterious" diseases,—will be able periodically to command a supply of, say, ten specialists and six nurses to patch them up or even to shepherd them from the cradle to the early grave. "Our reliance upon the physician," said Emerson, "is a despair of ourselves".

The common illusion nowadays is that fleshmeat is a necessity of life, and this it is which blinds many to the advantages of a non-flesh diet. Yet the prescribed diet for the athlete nowadays is a non-flesh one. In medical circle it is now fairly widely recognised that a vegetarian diet provides pure blood, which combats disease and aids recovery from injuries, whilst it has often been shown that meat-eating does the reverse and tends to create a desire for drinks and also to stimulate the lower passions.

People should remember that one is easily the dupe of what one loves, and that the love of roast-beef is such that it is only too likely to pervert human mentality.

If, for a court of appeal one turns to Nature, one finds that everywhere the social and state-forming (vegetarian) animals rank higher, and are more successful, than the solitary (flesh-eating), and that everywhere carnivorousness condemns the species to backwardness and inferiority. Could anything be more convincing?

London

H. REINHEIMER

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"———ends of verse

And sayings of philosophers."

HUDIBRAS.

Month by month this journal has tried to gather together differing views on many different subjects held by men belonging to various schools of thought. It has also tried to present the Theosophical views of H. P. Blavatsky on these very topics. More than one esteemed correspondent, among our contributors and readers, has remarked upon our attitude and our work; one of them writing about our programme and policy referred in passing to "a certainly amazing phenomenon that Madame Blavatsky has something to say on so many branches of not only mystical but also of mundane knowledge". We have desired this recognition of her vast and variegated store-house of instruction, especially from those who are moulders of public opinion, for, such recognition will pave the way for an acceptance of her ideas at least as theories.

Our world is in sore need of an ethical philosophy—that is acknowledged by all; we are convinced that Theosophy is such a philosophy; we are convinced that it is capable of transforming the attitude of the individual, and of changing the mind of the race. Though immemorial and ancient "in the course of time the mighty art was lost"—that art of living founded on the synthesis of science,

religion, and philosophy; and it was H. P. Blavatsky who restored it in the modern world. "It is even the same exhaustless, secret, eternal doctrine" of the *Bhagavad-Gita* (IV.2-3) about which she said (*Secret Doctrine*, I. xlv):

To the public in general and the readers of the "Secret Doctrine" I may repeat what I have stated all along, and which I now clothe in the words of Montaigne: Gentlemen, "I HAVE HERE MADE ONLY A NOSEGAY OF CULLED FLOWERS, AND HAVE BROUGHT NOTHING OF MY OWN BUT THE STRING THAT TIES THEM." Pull the "string" to pieces and cut it up in shreds, if you will. As for the nosegay of FACTS—you will never be able to make away with these. You can only ignore them, and no more.

During this month of May—on the eighth—students of Theosophy belonging to various Theosophical organizations will celebrate the anniversary of Madame Blavatsky's death; and at their gatherings, as desired by her, in her last Will, extracts will be read from *The Bhagavad-Gita* and *The Light of Asia*—two of her favourite books, which embody the same grand and beautiful

Truths she herself laboured hard to propagate. Therefore, it is an opportunity and we will use it to put before our readers the Theosophical position about the one subject which is agitating all people—*viz.*, the betterment of the race. We say—Theosophical position; and it is necessary to add that we refer to the profound philosophy which Madame Blavatsky taught and not to the bizarre dogmas with which the world has been inundated under the name of Theosophy ever since her death. One of the duties of THE ARYAN PATH is to enable the world to distinguish between the pure Theosophy of H.P. Blavatsky and that pseudo-theosophy which is rooted in absurd claims of deluded claimants.

The Ethics of Theosophy are its most vital aspect, and they are shown to be rational and profound by the metaphysics of Theosophy. Theosophy, wrote Madame Blavatsky,

was intended to stem the current of materialism, and also that of spiritualistic phenomenalism and the worship of the Dead. It had to guide the spiritual awakening that has now begun, and not to pander to psychic cravings which are but another form of materialism. For by "materialism" is meant not only an anti-philosophical negation of pure spirit, and, even more, materialism in conduct and action—brutality, hypocrisy, and, above all, selfishness,—but also the fruits of a disbelief in all but material things, a disbelief which has increased enormously during the last century, and which has led many, after a denial of all existence other than that in matter, into a blind belief in the *materialization of Spirit*. The tendency

of modern civilization is a reaction towards animalism, towards a development of those qualities which conduce to the success in life of man as an animal in the struggle for animal existence. Theosophy seeks to develop the human nature in man in addition to the animal, and at the sacrifice of the superfluous animality which modern life and materialistic teachings have developed to a degree which is abnormal for the human being at this stage of his progress. (*Five Messages*, p. 6)

To combat this materialism in conduct and action, which still flourishes, Theosophy offers principles and rules of ethics not for mere belief but for actual practice, and thus teaches the animal-man to be a human-man. Theosophy insists that man shall understand why he should do good and how and thus advocates the double activity of learning and doing. To do good seems an easy task, but to do it rightly—! The knowledge of what is good to do is not easily acquired. Who is ignorant of the elements of good life and good labour? None; and yet when called upon to define what self-sacrifice is, or whence selfishness, or why one should be sober, or how to mortify the personal self—there are not only differences of opinion but a grand confusion. Theosophy helps its students to give definite values and names to definite principles and things; thus its abstract philosophy produces a very concrete system of ethics.

Between philosophy and ethics there is a divorce; Theosophy regards them as two sides of a shield and offers an ethical philosophy by which life is to be lived day by day. Theosophy has joined

together what theology of every organized religion succeeded in pulling asunder. Theosophy has garbed in reasoned explanation the ethics of the old world—of the Sermon on the Mount, the Tao-teh-King, the Dhammapada, the Bhagavad-Gita, and has made its rules and injunctions useful for personal application.

"Teach to eschew all causes; the ripple of effects, as the great tidal wave, thou shalt let run its course."

This ancient aphorism is once again taught in Theosophy.

Work with causes; leave effects to work themselves out; "the suppression of one single bad cause will suppress not one, but a variety of bad effects". If we enquire—wherein lies the cause of human misery? we learn that—"Verily there is not an accident in our lives, not a misshapen day, or a misfortune, that could not be traced back to our own doings in this or in another life. If one breaks the laws of Harmony . . . one must be prepared to fall into the chaos one has oneself produced." And what is true of the individual is equally true of any assemblage of individuals—a nation, a race, etc. Laws of Harmony are named laws of Life and collectively the Law of Ethical Causation. That Law "predestines nothing and no one . . . creates nothing, nor does it design. It is man who plans and creates causes, and the law adjusts the effects; which

adjustment is not an act, but universal harmony, tending ever to resume its original position, like a bough, which, bent down too forcibly, rebounds with corresponding vigour. If it happen to dislocate the arm that tried to bend it out of its natural position, shall we say that it is the bough which broke our arm, or that our own folly has brought us to grief?" (*Secret Doctrine*, II, 305)

Two difficulties arise: first, people find it very difficult to live by the discipline which alone uncovers the causes of events to their gaze; secondly, the zest, the enjoyment, the feeling of emotional more-ness are so bound up with effects, that most people do not like to leave them alone—till suffering compels them. People eat the fruit of Karma, and even when their attention is drawn to the fact that it is poison-fruit, they say—"may be so, but it tastes good"; once again, it is abject suffering which dissuades them from pursuing the old course. Among these defaulters are many Theosophical students themselves—for they too are mortals on whom the yoke of sense presses heavily.

However, from this central truth of Theosophical ethics an entirely new attitude to life, work and people arises. Altruism and disinterestedness assume new meanings; luxuries and necessities take new values; and altogether new standards of life reveal themselves. Not only is all this true in the world of objects; the affections and attachments

undergo a transformation—blood-ties, religious bonds, patriotism, are assigned different prices. Further still, progress and civilization, knowledge and inventions of Science don quite new garbs. The past and the future lose their vagueness; they begin to live in new forms. Just as for the astronomer and the mathematician the firmament speaks a language other than that for the men of city-streets, so also space and time and all objects therein tell a tale of themselves to the Theosophist, different from what falls on the ears of flesh. Aspirants and students of Theosophy try to gain and retain this new attitude, and among them are those who belong to no Theosophical organisation.

But is not this task a special one, which the large masses of people cannot undertake?—we will be asked. Theosophy answers—that is not wholly true. For, there are four links of the golden chain which should bind the masses and the classes in every land, as well as nations and races, into one family, one Universal Brotherhood. They are (1) Universal Unity and Causation; (2) Human Solidarity; (3) the Law of Karma; (4) Reincarnation. These lead to a full recognition of equal rights and privileges for all, and without distinction of race, colour, social position, or birth. Let the natural leaders of the masses, those whose modes of thought and action will sooner or later be adopted by those masses, begin to learn and

live by the ethics of Theosophy, and they will be able to teach these facts, suited to the mass *mind*, and elevate it. For every class as for every temperament Theosophy has instruction and guidance.

Lest all this may sound arrogant, or like making special claims on behalf of Theosophy, we will quote these words of H. P. Blavatsky:—

Theosophists are of necessity the friends of all movements in the world, whether intellectual or simply practical, for the amelioration of the condition of mankind. We are the friends of all those who fight against drunkenness, against cruelty to animals, against injustice to women, against corruption in society or in government, although we do not meddle in politics. We are the friends of those who exercise practical charity, who seek to lift a little of the tremendous weight of misery that is crushing down the poor. (*Five Messages*, p. 8)

We will close with a description of the practical working of the doctrine of *Universal Brotherhood* which the Masters of H. P. Blavatsky gave:—

He who does not practise altruism; he who is not prepared to share his last morsel with a weaker or poorer than himself; he who neglects to help his brother man, of whatever race, nation, or creed, whenever and wherever he meets suffering, and who turns a deaf ear to the cry of human misery; he who hears an innocent person slandered, whether a brother theosophist or not, and does not undertake his defence as he would undertake his own—is no theosophist.